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ABSTRACT 
 
For lack of enough empirical studies on capital structure of Chinese firms and to further 
explore the determinants of capital structure, this thesis employs a newest dataset from 
year 2004 and 2005, composing of 336 firms from main board of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and small and middle enterprises (SMEs) board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
to empirically study the determinants of capital structure for Chinese firms.  
 
Based on review of relevant capital structure theories, mainly pecking order model and 
trade-off theory and previous empirical studies in this field from different countries, 
eight potential independent variables are included in the regression models and different 
leverage ratios of both book values and market values are used as dependent variables.  
 
Results derived from this thesis are in line with the dominant results from previous 
empirical studies on Chinese firms. Identified negative determinants include 
profitability and non-debt tax shield. Positive determinants identified are years listed on 
the stock markets, size, volatility and tangibility. Results for growth opportunities are 
quite mixed and state-owned shares ratio is not significant. Consistent with previous 
studies, much lower long-term debt ratio is found for Chinese listed firms which can be 
explained by the small size of bond market, special role of short-term debt and the 
preference of equity financing over long-term loans.  
 
For some results from this study are consistent with pecking order theory while others 
support trade-off models, it is difficult to say which model is more suitable in China but 
rather they combine together and determine the capital structures for Chinese firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  Capital Structure; Determinants; Trade-off theory; Pecking order 
model. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
When we read different companies’ balance sheets, it goes unnoticed that some 
companies use huge amount of bank loans, others issue new stocks frequently while 
others no debt, no new issuance at all.  Capital structures of different companies, or of 
the same company in different years differ a lot, which is an interesting question arouse 
much curiosity among researchers.  
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) published their paper focusing on corporate 
financing theory, much research has been done in this field. But until now, how do firms 
in different institutional environments choose their capital structure in practice is still a 
question without a clear answer.  
What is exactly capital structure? Capital structure is a firm’s mixed financing results, 
debt-to-equity ratio. Debt-to-equity ratio could mean different ratios by using different 
definitions of debt and equity. There are many different kinds of debts and at least two 
kinds of equity, common equity and preferred equity. Newly developed financial 
products, such as hybrids make the distinction between debt and equity more difficult. 
Hybrid could belong to equity or debt depending on the detailed contract, which entails 
more characteristics of debt instrument or equity.  
For Chinese companies, determinants of financing choice are a more intriguing and 
difficult problem to answer for environmental factors, such as the small size of bond 
market, immatureness of the stock market, and the important role of special 
“relationship” between banks and firms.  All those factors could affect corporate 
decisions about which financing source they would choose, such as internal funds, bank 
loans, issuing bonds or issuing stocks or which one they can choose. Another reason 
that makes Chinese firms interesting samples to study is that they are operating in a 
developing and transiting economy, which entails them many special characteristics 
different from firms in developed countries. For empirical studies about leverage in 
Chinese firms appeared until recently and with very limited quantities, still more 
research in this field are needed to arrive at a more clear conclusion.  
 8 
1.1. Purpose of the thesis 
This paper examines the theoretical models about corporate financing choices and 
related empirical studies in capital structure area for different countries. The main 
objective of this study is to examine which potential factors are determinants of capital 
structure decisions for Chinese firms in manufacturing sector by building regression 
models for a sample data composed of both big firms and small and middle-sized 
enterprises (SME), based on newest data in year 2005 and year 2004 from Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China. To find out if 
different factors play roles on big firms and SMEs,  we also make individual regression 
fro them.  
For there exists already a few studies on capital structure of Chinese firms, another 
purpose of this paper is to compare our results derived from a specific sector, namely 
manufacturing industry, with previous empirical results based on  the cross-sectional 
samples.  
Questions will be answered in this paper: 
1. Which factors are determinants of general public listed firms in manufacturing 
industry? 
2. Are the set of determinants of capital structure for big firms and SMEs the same? If 
not, what could be the potential reasons? 
3. Are there any difference between determinants when different measures of leverage 
are used? If yes, what could explain the difference?  
4. Which capital structure model should work better for listed Chinese companies? 
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1.2. Contributions and limitations 
There exist a few papers studying about financing decisions for Chinese enterprises. 
However, those studies appear until quite recently and still far from enough. And also 
some quite different results are given by different studies which could make leverage 
characteristics in China not so clear. In this sense, this paper contributes one more 
empirical study in this field.  
All previous papers are cross-sectional analysis for the main purpose is to find out 
determinants for general listed companies in China, but for firms listed in the main 
board are usually larger and state-owned firms. By adopting data of firms from a newly 
developed SME board in SZSC in 2004, more SME s and non-stated owned firms are 
included in the sample to balance the whole dataset.  
However, for the SMEs board in SZSC came into being since the end of 2004, it is still 
a very young market and the number of companies listed on this board is rather small, 
40 in 2004 and about 70 in 2005. Bias results from this limited number.  
Another limitation is that for the sample companies we use are all from listed 
companies, which are in general better ones in their respective industries. Hence, they 
might not be good representatives of an average firm.  
Besides, for the unavailability of some data, we have to exclude a few potential 
variables from our study. For example, for the tax system is rather complicated, the tax 
rates differ a lot for different types of companies, for companies in different locations, 
and also for the same company in different operating years. And it is very hard to 
collect all those information. We have to exclude tax-related variables from our study.  
1.3. Hypotheses of the study 
Based on previous empirical studies and capital structure theories, hypotheses are listed 
at follows. 
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H1 Expected relationship between profitability and leverage is negative. 
Based on different theories, the effect of profitability on leverage is different. According 
to trade-off models, it should be positive and from pecking order point of view, negative 
correlation is predicted.  
However, according to available empirical studies on Chinese firms, the dominant 
results are that negative relationship exists between profitability and leverage. 
It can be explained by the immature disclosure systems about firm information. Much 
asymmetric information exists between firms and investors and also between firms and 
banks. Hence, cost of external financing is much higher compared with the cost of 
internal funding. Firms prefer to use their own cash flow if it is available.  
H2 Positive relationship between firm size and leverage.  
Big firms are considered to be financially and operationally stronger with less 
possibility to go into bankrupt and in general they have better and longer relationship 
with commercial banks in China. Hence, it is easier for them to get more debt compared 
with SMEs. Taking the immatureness of stock market into consideration, more 
asymmetric information exists between firms and investors. Therefore, the adverse 
selection problem is more serious in China and equity issuance is expected to be the last 
resort for big companies. Bigger companies are expected to have more debt. For SMEs, 
it is quite hard to get bank loans. And in order not to forgo the good investment 
opportunities and to support their growth, they are willing to issue equity as external 
financing if they can. Therefore, debt/equity ratio is expected to be very low for SMEs 
who have the access to the equity market.  
H3 Growth rate is expected to be a mixed determinant of leverage ratios.  
If growth rate of a firm is quite high, it means the firm has many good investment 
opportunities and the expected rate of return is quite high. They are not reluctant to give 
up the highly profitable opportunities. But at this time, more capital is needed for the 
investments and it is quite possible the operating cash flow is not enough. Therefore, 
firms turn more to external funding resources.  
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However, for the immatureness of Chinese stock market, firms with higher growth rate 
can usually get more capital gains from secondary markets and equity issue might be 
preferred over bank loans. If firms can get access to equity financing as they want, they 
would choose equity issuance rather than bank loans. Under this circumstance, lower 
leverage ratios are expected.  
Meanwhile, to get permission from government to issue new equity is not easy. Hence, 
strict limitation comes from supply side. If firms can not get the funding by new equity 
issuance, they turn to bank loans and higher leverage ratios are expected.  
The correlation between growth rate and leverage is determined by different forces. And 
the final result depends on which force takes the dominant role.  
H4 Tangibility is expected to be a positive factor for the collateral value it could afford 
to decrease the banks’ risk.  
As known, tangible assets can be used as collateral for credit institutions to secure their 
loans and it is safer for banks to lend to firms with a lot of tangible assets. Therefore, 
higher tangibility should lead to higher debt levels. It is argued that this result is derived 
based on the assumption that debtors and creditors do no have close relationship (Berger 
and Udell, 1994), which is not the case in China. Admittedly, relationship plays a most 
important role. When close relationship exists between banks and firms, there is not so 
much asymmetric information and consequently, tangible assets might not be essential 
to secure loans for banks and the firms also would like to preserve the collateral value of 
the assets to enlarge its debt capacity for future financing.  If tangibility doesn’t play an 
important role in leverage ratios, it indicates somehow that relationship lending still 
plays dominant role in China. But it is expected that even though relationship lending 
still matters a lot in China, the role is diminishing and the credit institutions are 
increasingly recognizing the importance of counterparts’ financial standing to decrease 
the risk they take. Therefore, tangible relationship between tangibility and leverage 
ratios is expected.  
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H5 Volatility is expected to inversely relate to leverage ratios. 
The argument is that the more volatile a firm’s earning is, it is more risky for the 
creditors to lend money to it for the firm has bigger bankruptcy risk and therefore it is 
difficult for the firm to get debt.   
H6 State-owned shares ratio plays positive role on leverage ratios.   
State-owned shares include both state shares and legal person shares. Legal person 
shares are also included for they are held by entity or institution with a legal person 
status, e.g. a state-owned enterprise or a firm controlled by an SOE.  
State-owned enterprises (SOE) can get more bank loans and access bond markets for 
government helps in building the relationship between banks and SOE.  
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is organized as follows: in the first section, purposes of the study and 
research problems are presented. Hypothesis about results of the empirical study and 
contributions & limitations of this paper are also included here. In the following section, 
we discuss different theories of capital structure, which are categorized into the 
foundation-MM theory, trade-off models, pecking-order models and others.  
Chapter 3 reviews previous empirical study about determinants of leverage in different 
countries, including Chinese evidence.  To understand the quantitative results better, we 
introduce institutional environment of China in chapter 4, which includes the economy 
situation, legal environments and financial markets.  
In chapter 5, we describe the data source, sample composition and also the methodology 
we will adopt to analyze the data. And the empirical results are presented in chapter 6, 
with descriptive statistics, regression results and comparative analysis. Finally, we give 
a short summary and the conclusion of the paper in Chapter 7.  
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2.   THEORY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
2.1. Foundation—The Modigliani-Miller theory 
Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958) lays the foundation for the later study and 
discussion about capital structure. They showed that financing decisions don’t affect 
firm value in perfect markets. They argued that firm value can not be changed just by 
splitting its cash flows in different ways, which also means that a firm’s value is 
determined by its real assets rather than the securities it uses. Therefore, the conclusion 
is that capital structure is irrelevant for firms in perfect markets and the firm’s value 
depends only on its operating income and the degree of business risk.  And even though 
there may exist temporary different values between a levered company and un-levered 
one, the difference would disappear soon for in perfect market, no arbitrage opportunity 
exists. It is denoted as preposition I in MM (1958): 
Proposition I: The market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is 
given by capitalizing its expected return at discount rate ρ  appropriate to its class.  
 UV = LV  
Where UV  is the value of an unlevered firm, equaling to the price of buying a firm 
financed solely by equity; LV  is the value of an unlevered firm, equaling to the price of 
buying a firm financed by both equity and debt. If LV doesn’t equal UV , then there 
would be an arbitrage opportunity.  
Next, we will have a look at how preposition I is derived based on a simplified example. 
Suppose X = UX  = LX  represents future operating income, notice that both firms belong 
to the same risk class 
UV = UE   
LV = UE + UD  
r is  interest rate on riskless bonds 
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Consider two different portfolios in Table 1: 
Table 1 Cash flow of different portfolios. 
 Cash outflow today Cash inflow in the future 
Buy m% share of U 
UU VmEm ×=×
 
m X×
 
Buy m% bonds of L 
LDm ×  LDrm ××  
Buy m% share of L 
LEm ×
 
)( LDrXm ×−×
 
Buy m% of L 
LDm × + LEm × = LVm ×  XmDrXmDrm LL ×=×−×+×× )(  
For the two portfolios mentioned above have the exact same return, if no arbitrage 
opportunity exists, the costs to buy the two portfolios should be the same: 
UVm × = m LV× , denoting that  UV = LV . 
The assumptions MM used to arrive at their conclusion are listed as follows: 
1) All investors are price takers who couldn’t affect the price. 
2) No transaction costs for all market participants can borrow and lend at risk-free rate. 
3) No bankruptcy costs. 
4) No agency costs, which means that managers always act to maximize stockholders’ 
interest. 
5) No asymmetric information exists among all market participants. 
6) No taxes at both corporate and personal level. 
7) All firms belong to the same risk class. 
8) All firms can only issue risk-free debt or risky equity. 
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Under those strict assumptions, MM draws the famous preposition 1 (irrelevance 
proposition) discussed above. Following studies have shown the irrelevance proposition 
also holds in a more general framework, such as Stiglitz (1969) and Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973). In Frydenberg (2003), it is also demonstrated that the relaxing of 
risk class assumption doesn’t affect the results.  
By giving those restrictive assumptions, MM model is a pure theoretical one and not 
realistic for none of the assumptions are met in the real world. However, MM arrive at 
their final results by identifying and isolating critical variables which could affect firm 
values. Therefore, it has many practical instructions. All those assumptions could be 
potential determinants of capital structures and some of the assumptions have been 
proved to be real determinants by relaxing them in some empirical studies.  And many 
important theories in capital structure after MM, such as trade-off models, pecking order 
models are all developed based on MM theories by relaxing one or some assumptions 
used in MM theory. Two most widely discussed and most competing models about 
financing choices are trade-off models and pecking order models. We will give a brief 
discussion about these two branches of models in the following sections and other 
newly developed models thereafter.  
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2.2. Static Trade-off models 
2.2.1 Trade-off models 
Theories suggesting that there exists an optimal capital structure that maximizes firm 
value by balancing the costs and benefits of an additional dollar of debt are categorized 
as trade-off models. Considering the optimal leverage from different points of view, 
trade-off models can be sub-categorized in the following three types: models related to 
bankruptcy costs, agency costs and corporate control respectively.  
Before we delve into the details of the trade-off models, tax benefits from debt 
financing are briefly touched here. In Modigliani and Miller (1963), for interest 
payment is deducted before taxable income, debt financing could result in tax-shield 
benefits which decrease firms’ tax liabilities. This is the most important benefit from 
debt. Meanwhile, taking personal tax and also non-debt tax shield, such as shield from 
depreciation, into consideration, benefits of debt in taxes is offset to some extent.  
2.2.1.1. Trade-off models related to bankruptcy costs 
In Baxter (1967), the costs incurred by financial distress were identified as non-trivial 
and could reimburse the tax benefits of debt financing. From Figure 1, we can see the 
basic idea of this theory. Debt has both advantages and disadvantages for firms: 
advantages come from the tax-shield of debt clarified in MM(1963) and disadvantages 
come from the increasing probability of bankruptcy for a company with increasing debt 
hence the cost of bankruptcy is increased. Prediction of tradeoff theory is that an 
optimal capital structure does exist and is decided on achieving the balance between the 
benefits of debt and the costs associated with debt, holding other variables constant. 
Firms substitute debt with equity or equity with debt until the firm value is maximized. 
This is the original static trade-off theory which is derived by relaxing the no taxes and 
no bankruptcy cost assumptions in MM theory.  
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Figure 1 The Static Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure. 
2.2.1.2. Trade-off models related to agency costs 
In Jensen and Meckling (1976), based on the common knowledge that debt had been 
widely used prior to the existence of the tax subsidies on interest payments, given the 
positive bankruptcy costs, they argue that there must be other important determinants of 
capital structure that haven’t been identified.  
In this paper, two kinds of conflicts were identified. The first kind of conflicts is 
resulted from the interest divergence between shareholders and managers who are not 
wholly-owners of the firms. In corporations, managers don’t possess all residual claim 
but they do bear all the cost. When an owner manager is not a wholly-owned one, which 
means some outside shareholders exist, his objective is not to maximize the firm’s value 
but to maximize his own shares. The less ownership the manager has, the more severe 
the divergence between the other stockholders’ interest and the mangers’.  
Here we can have a look at where the benefit of debt financing related to agency 
problem comes from. By increasing debt and with the constant shares of mangers, the 
manager’s share of the equity increases and the loss from the conflict decreases. Also, 
for with more debt, firms have to pay more cash as interests and free cash flow is 
decreased. Hence, the cash available to managers to engage in some activities which 
would affect the maximize profit is also decreased (Jensen (1986)). Besides, through 
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debt financing, control of firms can be limited to a few agents by raising part of the 
capital through debt financing, such as bank loans or bond sales, reducing agency cost 
of management. 
In Grossman and Hart (1982), another benefit of debt financing is clarified. When a firm 
goes to bankrupt, the costs could be huge for managers. The incurred costs could 
include lose of control of the firm, deterioration of reputation. The managers work 
harder, not risk too much and diverge the operation objective too far from the 
company’s interest in order not to fall into “bad firm” categories. Also in Harris and 
Raviv (1990), the disciplining role of debt is suggested. For managers don’t always 
behave in the best interest of their investors. In this context, when a firm is near to 
liquidate, managers may choose not to liquidate for reputation and other considerations. 
Debt can serve as a disciplining device for default allows the creditors the power to 
force the firm into liquidation.  
The second kind of conflicts is between debt-holders and equity-holders for debt 
contract makes equity-holders to invest sub-optimally.  When an investment gives large 
profits, stockholders can get most of the gain. But when the investment fails, debt-
holders also bear the loss. Consequently, equity-holders may prefer to invest in very 
risky projects. Risky projects result in decrease in the value of debt. This is the agency 
costs of debt financing. However, if debt issuers can forecast equity holders’ behavior, 
whether to risk too much or not, they can price adequately to transfer the costs back to 
the equity holders.   
Thus, Jensen and Meckling argue that an optimal capital structure can be attained by 
finding the point where the total agency cost is minimized. It can be described in Figure 
2. They achieved this conclusion by relaxing the MM assumption that no agency costs 
exist.  
An extension of the agency problems was given in Myers (1977). When a firm 
confronted with bankruptcy, equity holders don’t have incentive to contribute new 
capital to value-increasing investments for the returns from the new investments go 
mainly to the debt-holders but meanwhile, equity-holders undertake the whole cost. In 
this situation, more debt financing, the more severe the agency costs of debt. 
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2.2.1.3. Trade-off models related to corporate control 
 Another branch of theory could be categorized into trade off models are derived from 
corporate control considerations. Models based on corporate control are initiated by the 
growing takeover activities in the 1980’s. The studies are all based on the fact that 
common stocks carry voting rights while debt does not. Harris and Raviv (1988), 
Stulz(1988) and Israel(1991) discussed the relationship between capital structure and 
corporate acquisitions. There is some difference in the process to arrive at their results, 
e.g. the first two papers study how capital structure affects the outcome of takeover 
contests through distribution of votes between management and outside investors. By 
comparison, Israel (1991) argues that the outcome of takeover contests is affected 
through its effect on the distribution of cash flows between voting and nonvoting 
securities. However, the results those three papers have identified are quite similar, that 
is the optimal debt level of a firm can be achieved by the trading off between the 
probability of acquisition and share of the synergy for the target’s shareholders. Here we 
summarize the study of Israel (1991), focusing on the analysis of relationship between 
debt level and acquisition and neglecting the price effects of acquisition for it is not of 
importance for this thesis.  
 
Optimal leverage % debt 
% equity 
Agency costs of debt 
Agency costs of equity 
Total agency costs 
Figure 2 Optimal leverage determined by minimizing agency costs. 
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In Israel (1991), two different effects of debt financing were identified. On the one 
hand, high debt level leads to higher price the potential acquirer has to pay for the target 
firm and the expected payoff of equity-holders of the target firm increases. This is the 
value-increasing effect from debt financing. Assumptions used here: debt is issued in 
competitive markets and yielding zero net present value to debt holders. All premiums 
from appreciation of debt by acquisition go to equity-holders of the target company.  
On the other hand, for the minimal ability of acquirer is required to be higher to make 
the acquisition profitable under higher debt levels, the possibility that the potential 
acquirer possess this minimal ability is lower and thereby the likelihood of the 
acquisition is smaller. This is the value decreasing effect from debt financing.  
Thus, Israel argues that optimal capital structure can be obtained by balancing the two 
sides discussed above.  
The discussion above is about how debt financing would affect firms. How about the 
other way around? If all other things equal, the lower probability the firms being an 
acquisition target, the lower the debt level. And the higher the acquisition price, other 
things being equal, the less possibility the target being acquired and hence less debt is 
issued.  
If an acquirer owns higher bargaining power, the managers have to try to transfer more 
wealth from the acquirer to the debt-holders and then to the shareholders to reimburse 
the decreased wealth on the equity part. Therefore, target firms with acquirers who have 
higher bargaining power issue more debt. 
The results Israel arrived at are summarized as Lemma 2 in his paper: 
The optimal debt level F# decreases with acquisition costs T and increases with 
acquirers’ bargaining power v.   
2.2.2. Determinants derived from trade-off models  
• Determinants derived from tax shields 
Considering only tax related effects on firms, following factors are potential 
determinants of debt-to-equity ratios holding other variables constant. 
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1) Corporate tax rates 
Increase in tax rate will increase tax shield of a firm, thus reducing taxable income and 
thereby reducing tax liabilities. Hence, positive relationship between tax rates and 
leverage is expected.  
2) Non-debt tax shields 
It is a negative explanatory variable for tax deductions for depreciation and investment 
tax credits can be substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) predict that leverage is inversely related to non-debt tax shields.  
3) Personal tax rates 
It is negatively affect debt ratios for in real world, the personal tax rate on interest is 
higher than the effective personal tax rate on equity distributions. Therefore, personal 
tax in some way penalty bondholders more and offset the tax benefits of debt at the 
corporate level.  
4) Profitability  
It is expected to positively correlate with capital structure for firms with more profitable 
assets commit a larger part of earnings to interest which is debt payments. 
• Determinants derived from agency problems 
Based on agency costs trade off models, an optimal capital structure can be attained by 
minimizing agency costs. Hence, in industries where the potential agency costs of 
outside equity or debt are quite different, different leverage levels are expected and use 
of the low agency cost financing arrangement is chosen. For example, when potential 
agency cost from outside equity is quite huge, such as industries where the firm value is 
easily decreased by managers, little outside equity and high debt level is best for the 
firms and vice versa, such as restaurants which are usually run by owner-managers.    
Besides, taking the benefits of debt in decreasing agency costs, discipline role and 
informational role into account, the positive potential determinants include: 
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1) Liquidation value  
In Harris and Raviv (1990a), it is argued that firms with higher liquidation value, e.g, 
with more tangible assets, have more debt. Increases in liquidation value make 
liquidation the best strategy, and hence information is more useful. Consequently, a 
higher debt level is required.  
2) Firm value 
Following the arguments that liquidation value affects debt levels positively, Harris and 
Raviv (1990a) indicates that the higher liquidation value, the higher market value of the 
firm compared with similar firms with lower liquidation value. Consequently, positive 
relation should exist between firm value and debt level.  
3) Default probability 
Harris and Raviv (1990a) points out that firms with bigger liquidation value have more 
debt and thus pay higher yields. They are more likely to default. The higher liquidation 
value (also the bigger the default probability), the better the liquidation strategy. 
Therefore, higher debt level is required.    
4) Extent of regulation 
It is in Jensen and Meckling (1976) the relationship between extent of regulation and 
leverage is investigated.  Industries which permit less asset substitution, one of the most 
important costs of debt financing, have higher debt levels, such as regulated public 
utilities, banks and firms in mature industries with few growth opportunities. 
5) Free cash flow 
Holding growth prospects the same, firms with more free cash flow can benefit more 
from debt financing for the controlling effects of debt. This is mentioned in Jensen 
(1986) and Stulz (1990). 
Negative determinants: 
1) Extent of growth opportunities 
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Still based on the decreasing free cash flow problem in Jensen (1986), holding the 
amount of FCF constant, firms with more growth opportunities have less FCF and 
hence lower debt financing level is required.  
Combining cash flow and growth together, firms that generate large cash flows but few 
or negative growth prospects are confronted with more serious problems that cash flows 
may be wasted by investing into bad projects. Hence, the control function of debt is 
more important. 
2) Interest coverage 
In general, firms with higher leverage level offer higher yields, hence lower interest 
coverage which is mentioned in Harris and Raviv (1990a). 
3) The probability of reorganization following default 
Still in Harris and Raviv (1990a), argument for this factor goes like this: increases in 
liquidation value decrease the probability of reorganization, so negative correlation is 
expected between debt levels and the probability of reorganization after default.  
• Determinants derived from bankruptcy problems 
From trade-off models based on bankruptcy costs, the following potential determinants 
can be identified, assuming the other variables constant: 
1) Profitability  
On the one hand, the more profitable the firm is, the more tax-shields it can get from 
debt financing, higher leverage level is beneficial for firms. On the other hand, the less 
profitable a firm is, the bigger the expected bankruptcy possibility and also the bigger 
the bankruptcy costs. From the selling side of credit, creditors would reluctant to 
provide capital to less profitable firms and vice versa. Therefore, positive relationship 
between leverage and profitability is expected. 
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2) Size and diversification  
Size and diversification are positive factors for in general, small companies with only 
one or two products are easier to go to bankrupt and vice versa.  
3) Volatility  
Firms with volatile earnings are more risky. The leverage level is expected to be lower. 
Therefore, volatility is a negative determinant.  
4) Tangibility  
The more tangible assets a firm has, its counterparts, the creditors are confronted with 
less bankruptcy costs for bigger recovery value. Also, it is easier for firms with high 
tangibility to get more debt. Thus, positive relationship is expected.  
5) Uniqueness 
Titman (1984) argues that uniqueness of products is negatively related to debt ratios for 
the liquidation value is smaller and bankruptcy cost might be bigger.  
6) Growth rate 
According to Baskin(1989), growth rate is argued to be a negative determinant for the 
higher the growth rate, the greater the bankruptcy risk. 
• Determinants derived from corporate control 
From corporate control point of view, determinants of leverage include the following 
factors: 
1) Acquisition cost  
The higher the acquisition cost, the lower the possibility to be acquired target and 
thereby lower debt level is expected.  
2) Bargaining power of acquirer  
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The higher the bargaining power of an acquirer, the target firm needs to borrow more to 
transfer the wealth from debt-holders to equity-holders. Thus, positive relation is 
expected.    
2.2.3. Summary of determinants from trade-off models 
Potential determinants and the expected effects on capital structure is summarized in 
Table 2.  
Table 2 Summary of determinants from trade-off theory. 
Positive determinants Negative determinants
Corporate tax rate Non-debt tax shields
Profitability Personal tax rate
Liquidation value Growth opportunities
Firm value Interest coverage
Default probability Probability of reorganization after default
Extent of regulation Volatility
Free cash flow Uniqueness
Size and diversification Acquistion cost
Tangibility
Bargaining power of acquirer
 
2.3. Pecking order models 
Along with trade-off models, pecking order theory is the other most competing one in 
capital structure theories. Pecking order models are built on the existence of asymmetric 
information between firms and investors and hence are based on the relaxing of the 
assumption that no asymmetric information exists in MM (1958). The main difference 
between static tradeoff models and pecking order models is that the latter one doesn’t 
suggest the existence of an optimal debt ratio, but argue that there exists an optimal 
hierarchy of raising funds. And in pecking order theory, current capital structures of 
firms are accumulated results of their past financing requirements and debt ratios 
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change in response to imbalances between internally generated cash flows and 
investment opportunities.  
2.3.1. Pecking Order Theory 
Myers and Majluf (1984) gave a detailed discussion on corporate financing choices 
under asymmetric information. Their conclusion is that to maximize the old 
shareholders’ interest, firms always prefer to using internal funds over external funds, 
debt issuance over equity issuance when external funds are needed to maximize the old 
shareholders’ interest.  
Assumptions used to arrive at this conclusion are listed as followings: 
1 Capital markets are efficient with public available information, no transaction costs 
for issue stock. 
2 Managers have information that investors do not have and both managers and 
investors know this.  
3 Management acts in the interests of old stockholders and old stockholders are passive, 
which means they don’t rationally rebalance their portfolios when they learn more 
information from the firms’ actions.  
First, internal funds are always favorable to external funds. When a company has ample 
slack, it is not willing to use external financing which will result in possible conflicts of 
interest between old shareholders and new ones. Besides, when a firm has enough slack 
and if at this point the stock is overvalued, it may be tempted to issue stock. But for the 
investors also know this, attempt to issue gives investors negative information.  
Second, debt is favorable over equity. 
Situation 1: choice of debt or equity is pre-announced 
oldV = 1EIba −++ ; 
oldV = )( 1 EEbaS −−++ ,  
 Where  S denotes  financial slack;          
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             a  denotes assets-in-place;          
             b represents investment opportunity; 
             I denotes required investment;   
            
oldV
 represents the value of old shares; 
             t=+1 is when the market receives the information that managers received about 
the value of the firm’s asset-in-place and investment opportunity on an earlier time t=0; 
            E is equity required for new investments; 
            E1 is the newly issued shares’ market value at t = +1; 
           )( 1 EE −  is the capital gain or loss of new shareholders at t=+1. 
Only when  S+a ≤ S+a+b- )( 1 EE − , or b E∆≥  holes, new shares are issued.  
The same argument goes with bond issuance, only when b D∆≥  bonds are issued.  
For bonds is not as risky as equity and in general ED ∆≤∆ , if the firm is willing to 
issue equity, it is also willing to issue debt. But under some conditions 
when EbD ∆≤≤∆  it won’t issue equity but only debt.  
Situation 2: choice of debt or equity is not pre-announced, chosen at t=0 
Market value of old stockholders when No issuance of debt or equity 
oldV =S+a 
Additional payoffs to old stockholders when issue external funds and invest. 
b - E∆  equity issuance 
b - D∆   debt issuance 
If equity is chosen, it signals that  
E∆  D∆≤   
capital gains of realized by new stock or bondholders at t=+1 when the firm’s true value 
is revealed.  
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The condition that firms would choose equity over debt is that E∆  D∆≤ . This can be 
found only when E∆ <0. Therefore, no price can be found where the firm would like to 
issue equity rather than debt and meanwhile, new investors are willing to buy.  
In other words, equity issuance is always not favored by firms for the following reasons: 
when equity is undervalued, the benefits to the old shareholders from investing in the 
new investments are less than the dilution costs resulting from issuing new equity; when 
equity is overvalued, the firm would like to issue new stock to maximize old 
stockholders’ interest but investors also know this, they discount the stock price and 
they translate the equity issuance into bad news of the firm.  
Some papers suggest different results from pecking order theory. Giammarino and 
Neave (1982) argued that under the condition that managers and investors know the 
same information except firm risk, equity issues are preferred for the time when 
managers want to issues debt is when they know the firm is riskier than what investors 
believe. But meanwhile, investors also realize this and they won’t buy the debt. Only 
equity, or convertible security can be issued by finding an equilibrium price. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) also mentioned Giammarino and Neave (1982) in their paper. 
But they argue for asymmetric information by clarifying that firm value is a stronger 
determinant of corporate financing compared with asymmetric information about risk, 
still pecking order holds in general. According to Myers (1984), it is also mentioned that 
if there is asymmetric information about variance rate, not about firm value, the pecking 
order could be reversed. In Halov and Heider (2004), it is argued that standard pecking 
order is only one special case of adverse selection argument. In this special context, 
adverse selection cost for debt is smaller compared with cost for equity. However, it is 
also possible in other contexts, the situation is reversed and hence, the pecking order is 
also different.  
2.3.2. Determinants identified by Pecking order model 
The most important implication from pecking order is that higher informational 
asymmetry leads to higher leverage and profitable firms use less debt. Then the hints we 
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can derive related to determinants of capital structure from pecking order theory are 
listed as follows: 
First, information asymmetry is the key factor to affect the leverage level directly. And 
all factors bring more asymmetric information could indirectly result in higher leverage. 
Among the identified factors firm specific determinants include firm size profitability 
and growth rate, tangibility of assets, intensity of research and development, asset 
volatility, age and level of institutional ownership. Next, we give a brief discussion the 
possible effects of those factors on capital structure. 
1) Firm size 
In Rajan and Zingales (1995), it is argued that bigger firms are more complicated and 
hence are confronted with higher costs resulting from asymmetric information. 
Therefore, less external financing is used by firms with larger size. However, in Berger 
and Udell (1995), it is supported that asymmetric information problems are more severe 
in small firms than in larger firms. And also in Fama and French (2002), larger firms 
usually have less volatility and thus higher leverage.  
2) Profitability and growth rate 
Based on financial slack is a negative determinant of leverage, holding investments 
fixed, leverage is lower for more profitable firms and holding profitability fixed, 
leverage is higher for firms with more investment opportunities  or higher growth rate.  
3) Tangibility of assets 
According to Frank and Goyal (2003), the most important of the conventional variables 
is tangibility. For firms with more tangible assets have less asymmetric information 
problems. Hence, lower debt levels are expected for lower cost for equity issuing.  
4) Asset volatility  
According to Halov and Heider (2004), asset volatility can be used as a proxy of firm’s 
investment risk. When asset volatility is huge, they couldn’t issue debt to avoid the 
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adverse selection of debt. In this situation, the firms would choose to issue equity. 
Consequently, inverse relationship between asset volatility and leverage is expected.  
5) Volatility of net cash flows 
In Fama and French (2002), it is argued that positive relationship between volatility of 
net cash flows and leverage for firms behave so to lower the chance of issuing new risky 
securities or foregoing profitable investments when net cash flows are in the lower part.  
6) Age 
Age refers to the number of years that current ownership has been in place in Berger 
and Udell (1995). Positive relationship exists between age and leverage for the older the 
company, the longer the relationship between banks and the firm, the less the 
asymmetric information, the lower the rate on the loan and hence the higher the 
leverage.  
7) Capital expenditure, dividends, R&D expenditure 
These three factors are all components of cash outflow and increase the financing 
deficit, they are expected as positive factors of debt in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999). However, it is tested in Aboody and Lev (2000) that companies with more R& 
D activities have more asymmetric information, based on this, R&D intensive 
companies might use less external financing.  
8) Level of institutional ownership 
In Best, Hodges and Lin (2004), level of institutional ownership is inversely related to 
asymmetric information for in general, institutional investors are better informed 
investors who monitor the firms closely. Therefore, more external financing is used for 
firms with high level of institutional ownership.    
9) Credit ratings 
A firm with investment grade rating has less adverse selection problem for more 
information is disclosed by rating agencies. Hence, firms use less debt and more equity. 
 31 
Lower leverage level is expected.  The arguments appear in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999).  
Also, from the assumptions Myers and Majluf used, management incentives could be 
also potential determinants. If they do not act as old stockholders’ interest, which is one 
of the assumptions of pecking order, but as both old and new ones’ or only as new 
stockholders’, the financing choice could be totally different. Unfortunately, this factor 
is difficult to be involved into empirical studies.  
Summary of identified determinants based on pecking order theory discussed above is 
reported in Table 3.  
Table 3 Determinants of capital structure from pecking order theory. 
Positive determinants Negative determinants
Size Size
Growth opportunities Profitability
Volatility of net cash flow Asset volatility
Age Level of institutional ownership
Capital expenditure Credit ratings
Dividend payout Tangibility
Research and development expenditure
 
2.3.3 Comparison of pecking order model and trade-off theory 
For some important determinants of capital structure, the two most popular capital 
structures give totally different prediction about their role. The different signs and the 
according arguments are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4 Different Predictions on key determinants.  
Expected relation with leverage ratios
trade-off model pecking order model
Profitability Positive Negative
Arguments
Profitable firms have lower 
possibility of bankruptcy and 
benefir mroe from tax shields 
of debt
For firms prefer to use internal 
fund always, the more profitable 
they are, the less they use external 
funds. 
Profitable firms suffer more 
from free cash flow problems 
which can be decreased by 
using more debt
Firm size Positive Negative 
Arguments 
Large firms face less 
bankruptcy risk and have 
greater debt capacity
Large  firms face lower degree of 
information asymmetry and lower 
cost of equity
Tangibility Positive Negative 
Arguments
Firms with more tangible 
assets face less bankruptcy 
risk and can afford more 
collaterals to secure debt
Firms with more tangible assets 
face less information asymmetrcy 
and lower cost of equity
Growth opportunities                         
Arguments Negative Positive
Arguments
Firms with more growth 
opportunities are more risky 
and face greater cost of 
financial distress
Firms with more growth 
opportunites than assets-in-place 
have more asymmetric information 
and also, they are in deficit of cash 
flow and have to turn to external 
funding
To alleviate underinvestment 
problems incurred by risky 
debt, firm tend to issue equity
Potential 
determinants
 
2.4. Other models 
2.4.1. Models based on product/input and output market interactions 
Studies in this field are still quite few. It is from Titman (1984), the relationship 
between a firm’s capital structure and the characteristics of its product or input is 
investigated. And the final result they found is that firms with unique products or high 
reputation to produce high quality products have less debt, which is consistent with the 
prediction from trade-off theory.   
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The relationship between a firm’s capital structure and its strategy in the product market 
is discussed in Brander and Lewis (1986) focusing on limited liability of debt financing 
and in Brander and Lewis (1985) focusing on bankruptcy effect of financial decisions. 
Starting from the idea that higher leverage induces equity holders to take riskier 
strategies given by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Brander and Lewis (1986) investigate a 
two stage sequential duopoly game. They show that output market equilibrium depends 
on capital structure and hence owners would choose different debt levels to influence 
the output market for their good. The equilibrium concept used here is rational Nash 
equilibrium. One of the conclusions they arrived at is that oligopolists tend to have more 
debt than monopolists in competitive industries.  Another important implication from 
this paper is that different debt levels across industries could be explained by industry-
specific factors, such as modes of competition, including price competition, quantity 
competition and others. All factors related could be potential determinants of capital 
structure in industry level.  
According to studies in this field, input and output markets have been proven to 
influence capital structure, another important determinant of capital structure besides 
taxes, asymmetric information, bankruptcy costs and agency costs. Identified factors 
include types of products (Makesimovic and Titaman (1991), relative bargaining power 
between firms and non financial stockholders (Subramaniam (1998), type and degree of 
output market competition (Showalter (1995), the elasticity of demand (Maksimovic 
(1988).  
2.4.2. Models based on market timing 
In practices, equity market timing is a well known phenomenon which refers to issuing 
stocks at high prices and buying back own shares at low prices. But it is until Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), the persistent role of market timing on capital structure is identified and 
supported by U.S empirical study. They argue that current level of capital structure is 
the cumulative outcome of past attempts of firms to time the market. However until 
now, mixed evidence is found to support that whether market timing works on financing 
choices temporarily or persistently, for example, in Tijs and Leo (2004), Welch (2004), 
HovaKimian (2003), marketing timing is found to be not a significant determinant for 
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their samples. And in Kayhan and Titonan (2004), only short term effect of market 
timing rather than long term effect is supported.  
2.5. Summary 
So far, different capital structure theories have been discussed and based on different 
theories, a large pool of different sets of determinants are given and also, divergent 
effects of same determinant are predicted by different theories.  
From the determinants identified above, we can see that some of them can be 
empirically tested whether they are real determinants of capital structure or not, 
especially those quantitative ones, such as profitability, size, volatility and tangibility. 
While some qualitative factors are quite difficult to be included into empirical studies 
for they are very difficult to be defined in numbers, such as bargaining power between 
firms and non financial stockholders or the probability of reorganization after default.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
3.   PREVIOUS STUDIES 
In previous chapter, we have analyzed different theoretical models of capital structure to 
establish a theoretical framework. In this chapter, we will have a review of previous 
studies, focusing on those papers which have contributed to the explanation of capital 
structure. The objective is to collect the empirical results of previous studies before 
proceeding into building up the explanatory model of capital structure.  
3.1. Evidence on determinants of developed countries 
3.1.1. U.S. cases 
There are prevailing empirical studies on capital structures of U.S. firms since 1980s. 
We would discuss briefly two of the studies before 1990s, have a look at the summary 
of the determinants from empirical study before 1990s from Harris and Raviv (1990) 
and also review a few papers written after 1990s.  
In Bradley et.al.(1984), variability of firm value, level of non-debt tax shields, 
magnitude of the costs of financial distress are tested whether they influence the firms 
optimal capital structure or not based on 851 U.S. firms from 25 different industries 
during 1962 - 1981. By making an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, it is 
demonstrated that significant negative significant negative relation exists between 
leverage and firm volatility and also between leverage and Advertising and R&D 
expenditures, which are consistent with the hypothesis. But non debt tax is found to be a 
significant positive determinant which is in contradiction to the prediction. This casts 
doubt on the argument that non debt tax shields are substitutes for interest tax shields. 
The positive relation could be explained by the cause of high level of non-debt tax 
shield. In general, it is resulted from firms investing heavily in tangible assets. And it is 
argued in Scott (1977), firms with more tangible assets can secure their debt and hence 
can borrow at lower interest rates. Besides, it is also found mean leverage levels differ a 
lot for different industries. By performing a standard analysis or variance using industry 
dummy variables, 54% of the cross sectional variance in firm leverage can be explained 
by industrial classification.  
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In Titman and Wessels (1988), uniqueness as a potential determinant of capital structure 
is discussed and empirically tested.  Linear structural modeling, an extension of the 
factor-analytic is adopted to mitigate the measurement problems of regression. Another 
characteristic of this paper is that it adopted six measures of leverage: long term, short 
term, and convertible debt divided by market and by book values of equity. Debt is 
measured in terms of book value. Sample used in this paper are 469 firms in 
manufacturing industry from 1974 to 1982. Attributes may affected leverage tested 
include collateral value of assets; non-debt tax shields; growth; uniqueness; industry 
classification (firms producing machines and equipment and others. For firms in 
machine and equipment sector face costly liquidation, they are financed with less debt; 
size; volatility; profitability.  
The following results are arrived at: negative relation between uniqueness and the debt 
ratios is found for the relation between uniqueness and collateral values the firms can 
afford. The evidence also indicates that small firms use more short term debt than larger 
firms. The possible reason could be that smaller firms face higher transaction costs 
when they issue long term debt or equity.  
And also negative relations exist between long term debt/ market value of equity and 
profitability and also between short term debt / market value of equity, which supports 
the pecking order theory that firms prefer internal to external financing. However, no 
significant correlations exist between profitability and book value of equity. It can be 
explained that borrowing is increased to the extent that the higher income leads to an 
increase in book value of equity by increasing the retained earnings. Consequently, this 
ratio is not affected. They can be seen as a support of trading off theory, that firms do 
have a target debt-to-equity value in book value.  
No effect of non-debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value and future growth on debt 
ratios are found in this study. However, results are not robustness for almost all the 
variables except uniqueness, which means that it could be problematic to put this 
empirical result into generalization.  
In Harris and Raviv (1990), empirical results about determinant of leverage on firm 
characteristic levels in U.S before 1990s are summarized as follows. 
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Table 5 Determinants of Leverage based on U.S. empirical studies. 
Characteristic BJK CN FH/L GLC LM Kest KS Mar TW
Volatility - - ns(-) + ns(-)
Bankruptcy -
Fixed assets + + + + ns(+)
Non-debt tax shields + + - ns(-)
Advertising - -
R&D expenditure - -
Profitability - ns(-) ns(+) - -
Growth opportunities ns(-) + - ns(-)
Size ns(-) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) + ns(-)
Free cash flow -
Uniquess -
Note: 
BLK  Bradley, et al. (1984)
CN    Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990)
FH/L  Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) and Friend and Lang (1988)
GLC Gonedes, et al. (1988)
LM     Long and Malitz (1985)
Kest  Kester (1986)
KS  Kim and Sorensen (1986)
Mar  Marsh (1982)
TW   Titman and Wessels (1988)
+ positive determinants
- negative determinants
ns(-) or ns(+) nonsignificant or at a very weak level  with negative sign or positive sign
blank cells not included in the studies
 
From the table, a few general determinants of U.S. firms can be found. Positive factors 
include fixed assets, which are positive in all studies mentioned above and non debt tax 
shields (with positive sign for two studies and one negative, one insignificant), size (one 
positive and all the others are non-significant). Negative determinants include volatility 
(two negative, two non-significant and one positive result), Advertising expense, R&D 
expense, profitability (three negative, two non-significant), free cash flow, and 
uniqueness of products. Strictly speaking, most results are quite mixed.  
In the following part, we will have a look at some empirical studies on U.S. firms after 
1990s which are not included in this table. The first two studies focus on the direct 
effect from cash flow on capital structure.  
In Catherine and Paul (1996), quarterly data of 162 firms from 3 manufacturing 
industries and 3 non-manufacturing industries from 1979 to 1989 are used  to build 
simultaneous equations model, and 3 stage least squares is used to estimate the models. 
Its main objective is to consider the contemporaneous and dynamic interaction between 
a firm’s capital structure and its cash flow at the same time.  
According to the results derived, investment and dividends both play positive role on 
leverage. Size of the firm and risk are also positive determinants of leverage. And the 
 38 
coefficients of other variables used in this study, including tax, tangibility and 
uniqueness are quite mixed. The most interesting result of this paper is that in the same 
period, leverage and cash flow tend to be negatively related but across time, leverage is 
positively related to future cash flow.  
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is also among one of the most important studies in 
capital structure theory. Funds flow deficit is formulated in this paper as follows: 
Funds flow deficit = dividend payments + capital expenditures + net increase in 
working capital + current portion of long-term debt at start of period – operating cash 
flows after interest and taxes 
Two models are tested in this paper 
Model 1: Amount of debt issued (retired) = a + b Funds flow deficit+ e 
Hypothesis: a=0, b=1 if pecking order holds 
The result is that regression coefficient of Funds flow deficit, b = 0.85 and the model 
has high R2 (0,86). This empirical outcome shows that the external funding is mainly 
composed of debt. For many individual firms, the R2 and coefficient estimates are very 
close to or even exactly equal 1.  
Model 2: Target adjustment model 
itititTAit eDDbD +−+=∆ − )( 1*α  
Where 0<bTA<1, it represents adjustment towards the target.
*
itD
 is the target debt level 
for firm i at time t. for target debt level is unobservable, two measures are used here: 
historical mean of the debt ratio for individual firm and a rolling target for each firms 
using only historical information and an adjustment process that involves a lag of more 
than one year.  
Significant adjustment (bTA =0.33) is achieved when target debt ratios are calculated as 
the sample mean debt ratios but insignificant when three or five year rolling average of 
the book debt ratio up to the preceding year is used.  
When two models are included into one, adjustment coefficient drops to one third of the 
previous one but still significant. And the pecking order coefficient stays the same. 
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The conclusion derived in this paper is that pecking order is a much better explanation 
of the debt-equity choice, at least for the mature, public firms in the sample. A well-
defined optimal debt ratio as predicted by the tradeoff theory is not found in this paper.  
The following empirical studies connect equity market with capital structure, but quite 
different results are given.  
In Baker and Wurgler (2002), marketing timing theory of capital structure is empirically 
supported. Market timing means that firms are more likely to issue equity when their 
market values are relatively high compared with book and past market values. And they 
buy back equity when the firms’ market values are relatively low. By testing the relation 
between current capital structure and historical market values, persistent effects of 
market timing on capital structure is found. Capital structure is the cumulative outcome 
of past attempts to time the equity markets.  
In Welch (2004), US firm data from 1975 to 2000 are used to study whether variations 
in debt ratios are caused mainly by external stock returns or by international managerial 
choices to readjust to their old target ratio. According to the study, past stock returns are 
the main reason to change debt ratio, the relationship is negative. And taxes induce 
firms to increase their leverage level. No significant influence from profitability, growth 
and uniqueness on debt ratios is found. Inverse relation is found between volatility and 
debt ratios. And for the herding variable, the firms are inclined to adjust their debt ratios 
towards their industry’. Hence, identified determinants of capital structure are stock 
returns, capital structure in firms’ peer industries, equity volatilities and  tax rates.  
In Frank and Goyal (2004), US data from 1952-2000 is used. Vector auto-regression is 
used to analyze debt and equity adjustments separately rather than in form of leverage 
ratio. It is empirically proved that there is a long run leverage ratio the firm reverts to. 
Deviations from the ratio help to predict debt adjustments but not equity adjustments, a 
high market-to-book ratio is associated with subsequent debt reduction, but no effect 
found in the equity market. Hence, the conclusion they arrive at is that market 
conditions, measured by market-to-book ratio, affect leverage adjustments. If it is high 
in an earlier year, then debt reductions will follow in the next year but no significant 
changes in equity is found.  
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In Kayhan and Titman(2004), history information and firm characteristics which have 
been generally agreed as determinants are included into one model. Based on partial 
adjustment regressions which regress changes in debt ratios on variables that capture the 
firm’s financing, earnings, investment, and stock return history, namely past 
profitability, financial deficits, past stock returns and leverage deficit. But focusing on 
the longer term effect of these factors, 5 to 10 years. They conclude that history does 
influence observed debt ratios and partially persist for at least ten years. But debt ratios 
tend to move back toward to the target ratios based on traditional tradeoff variables.  It 
is also indicated that a firm’s more recent history influences its capital structure more 
than its more distant history. And history effect reverses for opposite sign appears for 
the corresponding contemporaneous history variable.  
Other studies include MacKay and Gordon (2005) and Manohar et al. (2003).  MacKay 
and Gordon indicate that industry factors help to explain firm financial structure. 
Departures from the mean industry financial structure are systematically related to 
technology and risk choices relative to the industry. When firms depart from industry 
norms for financial structure, they also systematically depart along technology and risk 
dimensions. Manohar et al. show that leverage is positively related to product 
diversification but negatively related to geographic diversification based on 1127 
sample US firms.  
3.1.2. Others  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) is one of the earliest studies and one of the most important 
empirical studies in testing whether capital structure in other countries is related to 
factors similar to those identified to influence the capital structure of U.S. firms. 
Countries investigated in this paper are G-7 countries, namely Japan, Germany, France, 
Italy, the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. For there exists institutional difference in different 
countries, e.g., different sizes of power of the banking sector, G-7 countries can be 
categorized into bank oriented ones and market oriented ones. And also, other factors, 
such as tax code, bankruptcy laws, the state of development of bond markets, and 
patterns of ownership all may result in different determinants for capital structures.  
 41 
Variables tested in this paper include tangibility, investment opportunities, firm size and 
profitability which are among the consensus mentioned in Harris and Raviv (1990). The 
results show that tangibility consistently plays positive role on leverage in all countries 
in both book value and market value of leverage; the market-to-book ratio is negatively 
related with leverage and size is positively correlated with leverage except in Germany 
where it is negatively correlated. In Wald (1999), why larger firms in Germany tend to 
have less debt is explained. The reason is that in Germany, a small number of 
professional managers control a sizable percentage of big industrial firms’ stocks and 
thus they have the power to force management to act in the stockholders’ interest. 
Another result of the paper is that profitability is negatively correlated with leverage in 
all countries except again Germany and is economically insignificant in France. Two 
potential reasons for the negative relation between market-to-book value and leverage 
are given: one is that the higher the market-to-book value, the higher the 
underinvestment costs, the lower the leverage; an alternative one is that firms time the 
market by issuing equity when their price is high. But the evaluation of which 
explanation is more important or the real reason for these countries is not done in this 
paper but left for the future research. Also, potential reasons for the relation between 
size and leverage, based on bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information respectively, 
are also discussed but which one answers the question best is not given.  
Finally, the paper concludes that factors identified by previous empirical studies in the 
US are also determinants of leverage in other countries. However, deep understanding 
about why there these correlations exist needs to be further explored by delving into 
institutional environments of different countries.  
DeMiguel, A. and Julio Pindado (2001) study the determinants of capital structures in 
Spain. One of the characteristic of this paper is that it introduces a new variable to proxy 
financial distress costs, a variable with two components: the first component is a 
measure of the probability of occurrence, the difference between the standard deviation 
and the expected value of EBIT; the second is a measure of asset specificity, i.e. the 
intangible assets whose value would be lost if the firm declared bankruptcy. The 
argument is that: when expected value is negative, even volatility is quite small, the 
financial distress costs are perceived as high and vice versa. In addition, level of 
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intangible assets of the firms should be a determinant for under bankruptcy, these 
intangibles lose their values and decrease the recover value. The final results indicate 
inverse relation between non-debt tax shields, financial distress, cash flow and leverage; 
positive correlation between investment and leverage.  
In Chen et al (1998), similar determinants of capital structure for Dutch firms as in other 
empirical studies are found. One interesting result is that positive correlations exists 
between book value leverage ratios and market-to-book value which supports the 
signaling role of debt while negative relation is found between them which supports the 
pecking order model.  
Panel data of over 6000 Swedish companies from 1992 to 2000 are used in Han-Suck 
Song (2005) to investigate the determinants of leverage based on total debt ratios as 
well as short-term and long-term ratios. Tangibility, non-debt tax shield, profitability, 
size, expected growth, uniqueness, income variability, and time dummies are used as 
exogenous variables.  
Some new findings in this paper are listed as follows: 
Positive relation is found between tangibility and long term debt ratio but negative for 
short term debt ratio, which can be explained by that long term debt is used to finance 
fixed (tangible) assets while short term debt is used for non-fixed assets. 
For non-debt tax shield, no significant relation is found when use total debt ratio, but 
negative for long-term debt ratio and positive for short-term ratio. This indicates that 
when companies consider non-debt tax shields as substitutes for tax benefits of debt 
financing, they mainly take long-term debt into consideration.  
Size is a positive determinant for total and short term debt ratio, but negative for long 
term debt ratio, which could be explained by that small firms are more limited to get 
long-term bank loans. 
As in most empirical studies, profitability is a negative determinant. Non-significant 
factors include expected growth, income variability and uniqueness.  Time dummies 
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does play a role in debt ratios which demonstrates that changes in tax environment 
affect capital structures in firms.  
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), five different measures of leverage, both book 
value and market value, are adopted in Wolfgang and Roger (2004) to investigate the 
determinants of capital structure in Switzerland. And positive factor is tangibility. 
Negative determinants include growth opportunities, profitability, and volatility. Size, 
uniqueness, and non-debt tax shields don’t play a significant role in this empirical study.  
Empirical studies discussed above are summarized in Table 6.  
Table 6 Empirical results of some western countries.  
Characteristic RZ(1995) De(2001) Ha(2005) WR(2004) Ch(1998)
Volatility ns - ?
Financial distress -
Fixed assets + ? + +
Non-debt tax shields - ? ns
Advertising
R&D expenditure
Profitability - - - -
Growth opportunities - ns - ?
Size + ? ns +
Free cash flow
Uniquess ns ns
History growth ns(+)
Investment +
ownership 
Operating Cash flow -
Political Patron
Country G-7 Spain Sweden Switzerland Holand
Numbe of companies 6000 73 150
Time Period 1991-1997 1992-2000 1992-2001 1984-1995
 
Note: 
RZ(1999):   Rajan and Zingales (1995)     
De(2001):  DeMiguel, A. and Julio Pindado (2001) 
Ha (2005): Han-Suck Song (2005) 
WR(2004): Wolfgang and Roger (2004) 
Ch(1998): Chen et al (1998) 
Ns means non-significant and ns(+/-) denotes non-significant with positive or negative sign 
? means mixed results are found 
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3.2. Evidence on determinants of firms in developing countries  
3.2.1. Chinese cases 
Empirical studies on Chinese firms’ capital structure appear only recently and the 
number is still quite limited.  
Chen (2004) is one of the earliest studies in investigating determinants of capital 
structure for Chinese firms. For different institutional environments and financial 
constraints in the banking sector exist in China, it is suggested that different capital 
choices of Chinese firms from western firms are expected. Sample set is composed of 
77 listed firms from 1995-2000. 
One interesting finding is that size is positively related to total debt ratio but negatively 
related to long-term leverage. It is concluded that large Chinese firms use more short-
term finance and less long-term finance. And a new pecking order is introduced in this 
paper: internal funds, equity and debt. The main reason is that high capital gains in the 
secondary stock markets, underdeveloped bond markets, lack of protection for 
individual shareholders, and no obvious debt tax shields combine together to make the 
firms prefer equity financing rather than debt financing. Profitability and non-debt tax 
shields are identified as negative determinant and positive ones include tangibility and 
growth opportunity. Limitation of this paper is the relative small sample set which may 
make conclusion not applicable for an average listed firm.  
The objective of Chen and Xue (2004) is to verify the conclusion derived by Chen 
(2004) using a much larger data set, 729 listed firms from 1997 to 2001. In this paper, it 
is argued that for the underdeveloped bond markets and for the more serious agency 
problems existing in most Chinese firms, bank loans provide mainly short-term 
financing for working capital and share capital is the main source of finance for capital 
investment, hence long term debt level is relatively low in China compared with western 
countries. Besides by adopting a larger dataset, they add two more variables, dividend 
payout and state-owned shares ratios into the model. And the dependent variable they 
used is only total debt-to-total capital ratio without long term debt ratio. And book value 
rather than market value of leverage is chosen here for the high P/E in china, market 
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value is approximately 40% of the book value. Another reason is that the proportion of 
non-circulating shares is rather high, average about 65% of total shares. Similar results 
to Chen (2004) are arrived at and the new pecking order is supported.  
In Huang and Song (2005), a relatively large sample dataset, over 1000 Chinese listed 
companies, is used to analyze the characteristics of capital structure. Ownership 
structure and managerial shareholdings are introduced as new explanatory variables 
based on agency theory. And total liabilities ratio (= total liabilities / (total liabilities + 
book vale of equity) is argued to be the most suitable proxy of leverage for Chinese 
firms. The first reason is that when the creditor considers a borrower’s debt capacity, it 
considers not only the firm’s long term debt, but also its current debt and other 
liabilities. So the whole portion of liabilities will affect how much debt the firm can get, 
and hence affect the firm’s leverage ratio. The second reason is that current debt is a 
rather stable part of total assets for Chinese firms. Usually, the firms roll over the short 
term debt for the next few years. And lastly, trade credit acts also as an important means 
of financing, so accounts payable should also be included. And book value of equity is 
used here for financial executives think about capital structure targets in terms of book 
value rather than in market value.    
Consistent with the main body of empirical studies, firm size, non-debt tax shields and 
fixed assets are identified as positive determinants and profitability as negative 
determinant. Industries and managerial share-holdings play a role in determining capital 
structure. Opposite to general arguments that this negative relationship supports pecking 
order, negative relationship between profitability and leverage found here is used to 
support trade-off theory based on Chang (1999), positive relation between profitability 
and leverage is derived based on the optimal contract between employees and investors.  
Another interesting result derived in this study is a positive relation between volatility 
and leverage ratio.  
In Chen and Roger (2005), 972 listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China in 2003 are used to test various capital structure 
theories. They found that profitability is negatively related to capital structure, size and 
risk of the firms are positively related to the debt ratio in term of market value measures 
of capital structure but not in book value. Besides, years listed on stock markets are also 
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identified as one of the positive determinants. Different from Huang and Song (2005), 
in which institutional shareholdings is identified as a non-significant factor, here it is 
inversely related to leverage, i.e., the more institutional shareholdings the less they use 
debt financing. 
In Tong (2005), data of 50 largest Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2002 were 
used to test different models of corporate capital structure. In this paper, three models 
were tested to demonstrate the relationship between leverage and its determinants, 
between leverage and dividends, between corporate investment and its determinants. 
Significant negative correlation between leverage and profitability, positive between 
current leverage and past dividend were found to favor pecking order model over trade-
off model in China. But for only largest companies are used and the biggest companies 
are mostly from some specific industries, such as utility, hence again, the results of this 
study couldn’t be used to explain the capital structure decisions of smaller firms. And 
another limitation is that also only four potential variables, namely size, profitability, 
asset growth and dividend payout are tested whether they have effect on leverage ratio.  
Results of above-mentioned studies, the proxies used in the studies, number of sample 
firms and the time period are summarized in Table 7.  
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Table 7 Empirical results from Chinese case studies.  
Characteristic Chen(2004) HS(2005) Chen&Xue(2004) T(2005) Chen&Roger(2005)
Volatility ns ns(-) +
Tangibility + + +
Non-debt tax shields ns -
Advertising
R&D expenditure
Profitability - - - - -
Growth opportunities + - ns(+) +
Size + + ns(+) ns(+) +
Free cash flow
Dividend payout ns(-) ns(+)
Managerial shareholdings ns(-) ns
ownership structure ns(-) ns(-) -
Dependent variables
Overall leverage BV of total debt/ total
assets
Total liabilities/(total
Liabilities+BV of
equity)
BV of total debt/(BVof
total debt+ BV of
equity)
1BVof total debt/ BVof
total assets 2 BV of
total debt/(BV of total
liabilities+MV of total
equity)
Long term leverage BV of LT debt/ total
assets
Independent variables
Volatility
absolute value of the
first difference of
percentage change of
operating income
standard deviation
of EBIT
absolute value of the
first difference of
percentage change of
operating income
tangibility
tangible assets/total
assets
fixed assets/total
assets
tangible assets/total
assets
fixed assets/total
assets
Non-debt tax shields
depreciation/total
assets
depreciation/total
assets
depreciation/total
assets
depreciation/total
assets
Profitability EBITD/total assets EBIT/total assets EBITD/total assets EBIT/total assets
Growth opportunities
sales growh/total
assets growth
Marke-to-book ratio
of total assetsT
sales growh/total
assets growth
Size
Logarithm of total
assets
Natural Logarithm of
total assets
Logarithm of total
assets Logarithm of sales
dividend payout
ordinary dividends to
net income
Managerial shareholdings
total percentage of
directors and top
managers
ownership structure
institutional
shareholding
state-owned shares to
total shares
institutional
shareholding
Numbe of companies 77 1200 729 972
Time Period 1995-2000 1994-2003 1997-2001 2003
 
3.2.2. Others  
In Mamoru (2004), determinants of capital structure in East Asian countries, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand in the aftermath of 1997 crisis are 
investigated. In general, negative relationship between firm profitability and debt-to-
equity ratio in all the sample countries is found. And firm size plays a significant 
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positive role except in Malaysia. But the identified determinant, tangibility, in most 
industrial countries is found to be insignificant here. The explanation could be that 
closer relations exist between commercial banks and debtors. Besides, growth 
opportunity, proxy used here is market-to-book ratio, is also non-significant which 
demonstrates that high stock price in those countries doesn’t motivate firms to issue 
equity. 
In Fraser, et al. (2006), based on the fact that the Malaysian government plays important 
role of political patron on selected firms by listing restrictions, direct equity ownership 
of listed firms, control of the banking sector and some government-sponsored 
institutional investors, relationship between government patron and capital structure is 
investigated. Using data of 257 firms from 1990 to 1999 and adopting  three proxies of 
patronage, namely the percentage of direct government equity ownership of a firm, 
percentage of equity owned by institutional investors, and dummy variable the informal 
ties a firm may have with each of the three most powerful politicians in Malaysia in the 
1990s , significant positive effect of political patronage on capital structure is found.  
Yupana (1999) studies the determinants of capital structure in Thai firms by using 270 
listed firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996. One of the most important 
characteristics of Thai firms is identified and emphasized in this paper, that is the high 
ownership concentration of individuals or families and corporations. And to identify the 
role of ownership structure, measure of agency costs are used by using dummy 
variables: family-owned firms, conglomerate groups, foreign-owned firms, state-owned 
firms, a firm’s reputation, the size of the board of directors, managerial ownership and 
the degree of ownership concentration. The final finding is that the ownership structure 
effect financial polity, i.e., single-family owned firms have significantly higher debt 
level to protect their voting power. And also large shareholders are inversely correlated 
with debt ratio, which implied that they monitor the management in a much closer and 
stricter way.  Among other financial proxies, non-debt tax shields and profitability have 
negative effect on debt-equity ratio; and firms’ size and tangibility are positively related 
to leverage ratio; firm risk, measured by variation in sales is non-significant.  
Rather small sample dataset is adopted in Devic and Bojan (2001), namely 20 listed 
companies from Hungary and 18 from Poland. In both countries, consistent with 
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pecking order theory, negative relation between profitability and leverage is found. And 
in line with trade-off theory, positive correlation between tangibility and some measures 
of leverage is also found. Size is identified as the most significant factors in Poland but 
not significant in Hungary. But for Polish case, it is argued that size is not a proxy for 
bankruptcy costs for the strong relation exists between size and measures of leverage 
including both debt and liabilities but not between size and total debt to capital ratio 
Rather, size is a proxy for the strength of relationships between a company and its 
suppliers.  Negative, but non-significant relation is found between market-to-book value 
and leverage. An interesting finding is that in Hungary, none of the four determinants 
has significant effect on leverage when book value is used but in Poland, book value of 
equity is identified as a better proxy. This suggests that Polish enterprises mainly used 
book values when make leverage decisions but Hungarian firms use market values.  
The results of studies discussed above are summarized in Table 8.  
Table 8 Empirical Results of other empirical studies.  
Characteristic Yu(1999) Fr(2006) Ma(2004)
Volatility ns
Financial distress
Fixed assets + ns ns + +
Non-debt tax shields -
Advertising
R&D expenditure
Profitability - - - - -
Growth opportunities ns ns ns
Size + + + + ns
Free cash flow
Uniquess
History growth 
Investment
ownership -
Operating Cash flow
Political Patron +
Country Thailand Malaysia
Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the
Philippines and
Thailand Poland  Hungarian
Numbe of companies 270 257 119-681 18 20
Time Period 1996 1990-1999 1992-2001
DK(2001)
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3.3. Summary  
Based on previous studies discussed above, none of the determinants plays the same 
role in all empirical studies. Dominantly, profitability acts as a negative factor and 
tangibility is positively related to leverage ratios.  
For developing countries, size is identified as a significant positive determinant in most 
cases but not so obvious in western cases. For all other variables, the empirical results 
are still quite unclear.  
Compared with empirical studies with theoretical studies, only part of the identified 
determinants in theory have been tested and many of the qualitative factors are still 
unexplored. And according to empirical results, which model can explain capital 
structure better is also not so clear. But the best explanation could be that not only one 
theory works in corporate borrowing decisions, it might be that different forces work 
together and in different countries, even in different time periods, the dominant model 
changes.  
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4.   INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA 
Chinese economy, legal and institutional environments including capital markets will be 
briefly introduced in this section. Understanding those environmental factors would 
help us explain the quantitative results from the empirical study better. In the last part of 
this section, we will also give a short discussion about financing problems confronted 
with Chinese companies currently, how has the situation changed and also what future 
changes may take place.  
4.1. Chinese economy and legal environments 
China is a developing country and is developing very fast, average at 9% annually in 
recent years. It is also in its process of economy transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a fully market one. A lot of changes are happening in the whole country, 
including in the institutional environment, capital markets and also the behavior of 
enterprises. And all those changes could all have a considerable impact on financial 
policies of companies in this country.  
Basically, China is a “banking” country, which means banking system has strong power 
in the whole market. Financial assets in banking system account for over 80% of all 
financial assets in China. Most companies still depend on indirect financing rather than 
direct financing.  
Legal framework is still immature and incomplete. For an instance, about the debt-
holders’ rights, relevant company law is ambiguous. The most serious problem existing 
is that shareholders and government agencies are given too much power in bankruptcy 
procedures, no clearly defined private property rights and no effective property rights 
markets.  
Accounting and auditing environments in China are still not transparent enough when 
compared with developed countries. What makes the situation worse is that there is a 
lack of effective capital market for external corporate control. Consequently, more 
asymmetric information exists for firms, even the listed companies. But compared with 
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a decade ago, the situation is getting better and it is expected that company information 
will become more and more transparent with more efforts putting into this area.  
Based on the strikingly different institutional framework in China compared with 
western countries, the determinants are expected to reflect the characteristics of 
institutional structures and financial constraints, which may act as a more important 
factor than costs of capital.  
4.2. Financing channels in China 
4.2.1. Banking system 
Banking system still plays a central role in financial market in China. Even though 
recently some progress in financial market development has been achieved, firms are 
still relying heavily on bank loans for their financing. In contrast, the growth rate of 
direct financing market is still growing slowly.  
In 2003, new issued loans in financial institutions amounted at RMB 3 trillion which 
was 85% of all financing in that year1.  
But Chinese banking system is still highly regulated by central bank which is controlled 
by government. Commercial banks lend money at interest rates which are determined 
by central bank. And the same interest rates are used for almost all firms with a little 
difference under some extreme conditions. Commercial banks don’t have much 
flexibility to alter interest rates for different companies. This is quite different from the 
situation in Western countries, where the interest rates are determined by market force, 
i.e. good firms with less risk can borrow money at lower interest rates and bad firms 
have to pay higher cost to reimburse the higher risk the banks take.  
4.2.2. Stock market 
On 19th December 1990, SSE came into operation and later on, 3rd July 1991, SZSE 
followed, which marked the formulation of security market of China. From 1992, China 
                                                 
1
 Sources: Quarterly  Statistics reports from the People’s Bank of China 
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began to issue stocks to investors abroad. In the same year, the first B share came into 
trading in SSE.  
Shares in Chinese stock markets are classified as A shares, which are designated for 
domestic investors and B shares which at first for overseas investors but opened also to 
local citizens in 2001. A shares are dominantly owned by either the central government 
or the local governments, legal-person shares which belong to state-owned institutions. 
State shares and legal-person shares account for almost two third of the total share 
issues and are not allowed to be traded in the markets.  
Before 1998, rights offer to the existing shareholders proportionally was the main 
method to implement the issues after IPO. And the price of the rights is usually below 
market prices and usually the existing shareholders accepted all rights offers available to 
them. To apply for new issuance, annual return on net assets is required to exceed 10% 
consecutively in the past three years.  
Since 2001, it is getting easier to apply for new issuance either by share allotments or by 
public offering in stock markets. The condition is that the firm’s total return on net 
assets over the past 3 years exceeds 30% with average annual return of net assets not 
less than 6%.  
The development of Chinese stock market is summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9 Development of Chinese Stock Market.                                
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No. Of listed firms 53 183 291 323 530 745 851 949 1088 1154
No. Of listed Stocks 72 218 345 381 599 821 931 1029 1174 1240
A shares 53 177 287 311 514 720 825 922 1060 1130
B shares 18 41 58 70 85 101 106 108 114 110
Total Market Capitalization 
(100 million shares) 1048 3531 3691 3474 9842 17529 19506 26471 48090 43522
A shares 978 3319 3516 3311 9449 17154 19299 26168 47456 42246
B shares 70 212 175 164 394 375 206 304 635 1277
Source: National Bureau Statistics of China
 
Chinese stock markets have some specific characteristics compared with western 
countries. Firstly, the majority of listed companies in the main board of SSE and SZSE 
are state-owned companies. The foundation of the stock market was to serve for the 
reform of state-owned companies. Before the existence of security markets, indirect 
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financing from banks was the dominant channel for state-owned companies. Leverage 
level was quite high and the bad loans level was exceptionally high compared with 
international standard. The direct result was that the four state owned banks were at 
great financial risk. To alleviate this problem, SSE and SZSE were founded to widen 
financing resource of state-owned firms and to decrease the risks of banking system.  
Secondly, the stock market in China is still young and immature. Firms, especially firms 
with high growth rate, can get huge capital gains from secondary markets.  
Thirdly, quota control system for equity issues is practiced by Chinese government. And 
relative to demand, the quota is quite limited. Therefore, to get a quota for an initial 
public offering (IPO), firms have to pass strict screening process (measured by financial 
performance and proposed investment projects).  
4.2.3. Corporate bond market 
It was in 1981 that the first government bond was issued. Until now, government bonds 
have a dominant proportion compared with corporate bonds and institutional bonds. 
According to Chinese statistics report, RMB 1251.5 billion yuan were issued in year 
2003. Among this, treasury bonds accounted for 50.2%, financial bonds issued by 
policy banks accounted for 36.1%, RMB 452 billion yuan, Stocks issued made up of 
10.8% and last, financing by issuing corporate bonds was only RMB 35.8 billion yuan, 
accounting for merely 2.9%2. We can have another rough look at the structures of bond 
markets from 1997-2002 in Table 10. 
Table 10 Structure and development of Chinese bond market. 
Year Government bond
GB 
percentage Policy bond
PB 
percentage
Corporate 
bond
CB 
percentage
1997 554,8 57,4 % 349,1 36,1 % 63,3 6,5 %
1998 776,6 57,3 % 512,1 37,8 % 67,7 5,0 %
1999 1052,4 59,3 % 644,7 36,3 % 77,9 4,4 %
2000 1367,4 62,4 % 738,3 33,7 % 86,2 3,9 %
2001 1561,8 62,1 % 853,4 33,9 % 100,9 4,0 %
2002 1933,6 62,9 % 1005,4 32,7 % 133,4 4,3 %
Sources:Quarterly Statistics reports from the Prople's Bank of China
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And nowadays, to issue corporate bond, the firms have to get the permission from the 
administrative approval system. The State Development and Reform Commission limits 
the issues of corporate bonds to only project investment bonds, excluding those issues 
to support companies’ business operation. As a result, only a very small number of 
companies, largest state-owned enterprises which can also get financing from banks or 
equity markets could have access to the bond market. While all the other SME, non-
state owned enterprises could not satisfy their financing needs by issuing bonds.  
4.3. Special financing problem for Chinese companies 
One of the most acute problems existing in financing is that for small and middle sized 
enterprises, it is especially difficult to get enough funding to support its development.  
SMEs are usually private-owned, quite young, more risky and don’t have close 
relationship with banks. And it was almost impossible for them to pass the criteria to be 
listed on stock markets for the criteria are set for much bigger firms. To alleviate this 
special problem, SME board came into trading from 25th June of 2004 which adopts 
different screening criteria to be listed. The foundation of SME board improve financing 
situation of SMEs to some extent. But o be listed ones on SME board, the profitability 
and growth rate must be on the top level among all SMEs.  
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5.   DATA SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Sample selection  
The dataset we use is from SME board recently developed in Shenzhen stock exchange 
and from main board of Shanghai stock exchange. Sample selection is based on the 
following criteria: 
1) Companies in manufacturing sector in these two stock exchanges. 
2) Companies with only A share. Taking into consideration that for different types of 
stocks, e.g. A share and B share, pricing system is quite different, which results in that 
the prices of B shares are quite different from public A-shares for the same companies. 
The same argument goes for H shares. Hence, market value of different types of shares 
could be quite different for the same company. For comparability, we only choose those 
companies with only A-shares which are the dominants shares in capital markets of 
China.  
3) Companies with complete records of accounting data in year 2004 and 2005, and also 
with available stock price and outstanding shares in the end of year 2005. 
After selection, the dataset is composed of 336 companies, 297 from SSE and 39 from 
SZSE. About the accounting data we used are collected from company financial 
statement (balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement) and market related 
data are from www.cn.finance.yahoo.com.  
The limited size of the sample would result in some bias and it might affect the general 
application of the empirical result we arrive at later. But for our focus is to identify the 
key determinants for listed companies and compare with relevant studies, this selection 
bias should not be a major concern. However, when a larger database is available, it is 
should be reinvestigated in more details about Chinese firms’ capital financing 
decisions.  
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5.2. Variable Design 
5.2.1. Dependent Variable 
For there exist many different measures for leverage ratios, which can be categorized 
into long term debt ratio and total debt ratio, or book leverage ratios and market 
leverage ratios, discussion about which specified leverage ratios should be adopted is 
included in most empirical studies in this field. But for each measure has its own 
advantages and disadvantages, no consensus is derived so far.  
Among existing empirical studies on Chinese companies, the main leverage ratios used 
are calculated based on book value of debt and equity. According to Chen and Xue 
(2004), average leverage level based on market value is only 40% of book value 
leverage. The potential reason for this result is the immatureness of Chinese stock 
market, i.e. the pricing system is not so complete and the P/E ratio in china is much 
higher than in western countries. Hence, market price of stock is higher than it should 
be. Consequently, higher market value of equity for Chinese firms is found.  
Between long-term debt ratio and total debt ratio, it is generally agreed that total debt 
ratio is a better proxy for leverage. It is suggested to use total debt to total assets book 
value in Chen and Xue (2004). The reason is that by comparing with developed 
countries and other developing countries,  leverage measures in this way is in a similar 
level, 48.17% china, 66% G-7, 58% in US, (Rajan and Zingles, 1995), 51% in 
developing countries (Booth, 2001). However, with long term debt to total assets, it is 
very different, 6.31% for Chinese firms and 41% in G-7 countries (Rajan and Zingles, 
1995), 22% in developing countries (Booth, 2001). 
Even though there might be some preference in choosing leverage ratios, we will adopt 
different ratios to study the effects of potential variables on them. Moreover, based on 
the leverage ratios which have been used in previous studies, to compare with previous 
western papers and also empirical studies on Chinese firms and to find out if different 
sets of determinants exist for different leverage ratios, we decide to adopt eight different 
measures, which are described as follows: 
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Short term debt / book value of total capital = book value of STD/(book value of 
(LTD+STD)+book value of equity) 
Long term debt / book value of total capital = book value of LTD/(book value of 
(LTD+STD)+book value of equity) 
Total debt / book value of total capital = book value of (LTD+STD)/ /(book value of 
(LTD+STD)+book value of equity) 
Total liabilities / book value of total assets = total liabilities / (total liabilities +book 
value of equity) 
Short term debt / market value of total capital = book value of STD/(book value of 
(LTD+STD)+market value of equity) 
Long term debt / market value of total capital = book value of LTD/(book value of 
(LTD+STD)+market value of equity) 
Total debt / market value of total capital = book value of (LTD+STD)/(book value of 
(LTD+STD)+market value of equity) 
Total liabilities / market value of total assets = total liabilities / (total liabilities +market 
value of equity) 
The abbreviations we will use later on are listed in the Table 11: 
Table 11 Descriptions of dependent variables. 
BSL short-term debt to book vlaue of total capital
BLL long-term debt to book vlaue of total capital
BTL total debt to book value of total capital
BLIA total liabilities to ( total liabilities+ book value of equity)
MSL short-term debt to( book vlaue of debt+market value of equity)
MLL long-term debt to( book vlaue of debt+market value of equity)
MTL total debt to( book vlaue of debt+market value of equity)
MLIA total liabilities to ( total liabilities+market value of equity)
Dependent variables
 
5.2.2. Independent Variable 
The following independent variables will be used in our models: 
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•  Tangibility 
•  Business risk 
•  Size 
•  Growth opportunities 
•  State-owned share ratios 
•  Years listed on stock exchange 
•  Profitability 
•  Non-debt tax shields 
We focus on these factors for three reasons: 
• According to previous literature, these variables are the most important potential 
determinants. 
• Availability of some data limits our ability to develop other proxies for other 
factors. 
• To compare with previous studies, we adopt the most used measures by Chinese 
empirical studies.  
The measures and the according abbreviations we will use in the models and the 
expected effects on leverages are listed in Table 12: 
Table 12 Descriptions of independent variables 
Independent variables Measure Expected sign on leverage
Tangibility(TAN) fixed assets / total assets Positive or non-significant
Volatility(VOL) first difference of EBIT Negative
Size(SIZE) Natural Logarithm of total assets Positive 
Profitability(PRO) EBIT/total assets Negative
Growth opportunities(GO) Market-to-book value Positive
Ownership structure(SO) state owned shares to total shares Positive
Age(AGE) years listed on stock exchange Positive
 
There exist some potential limitations for proxies chosen in studies of determinants of 
capital structure. Firstly some attributes derived from different capital structure theories 
 60 
can not be well represented by available proxies or there exist a few proxies that can be 
used for one attribute, but it is difficult to decide which one is the most suitable. 
Secondly, the attributes that determine capital structures could correlate with each other, 
so the chosen proxies may measure the effects of several different attributes at the same 
time. 
Last but not least, measurement errors in the proxy variables may be correlated with 
measurement errors in the dependent variables thus creates spurious correlations.  
5.3. Methodology-Multi-linear regression models 
The method we adopted in this study to test the effect of the potential determinants on 
capital structure is based on a multiple-linear regression model. The dependent variable 
are different leverage ratios, and the independent variables include size, profitability, 
tangibility, growth opportunities, state-owned-share ratio, years listed on the stock 
exchange, non-debt tax shield and earnings volatility.  
The model used can be described as follows: 
   (1)    =iY εββββββββα +++++++++ 8877665544332211 iiiiiiii XXXXXXXX  
 
where iY  represents different leverage ratios 
 
         ijX (j=1,2..8) represent independent variables 
 
         jβ (j=1,2..8) represent corresponding regression coefficients of independent 
variables 
         ε  is the error term 
All explanatory variables are expressed as two-year average to minimize the effect of 
year to year fluctuations. Leverage ratios are calculated based on data from the later 
year for they are accumulated results of previous operations and can not be changed 
immediately after the values of independent variables change.  
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 6.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1. Descriptive characteristics of samples 
In the following part we will give a brief discussion of the descriptive characteristics of 
the sample firms. Moreover, we also compare the average leverage ratios with previous 
Chinese empirical studies.  
 6.1.1. Statistical characteristics  
The descriptive statistics of all variables, including mean, median, maximum, minimum, 
and standard deviation are shown in Table 13,14,15,16,17 respectively for different 
sample groups.   
The average long-term debt to total debt ratio for both boards are rather low, around 
18%. This result is in line with all previous studies on Chinese leverage levels (Chen 
and Xue (2004). It indicates that short-term debt is still the main part of debt for 
Chinese firms. And listed firms in China are still dominantly financed by their own 
share capital rather than debts. From supply side, lenders, one potential reason for this 
low long term debt ratio is the undeveloped bond markets in China. And another one is 
to get long term loans from banks is not a very easy task. From the buying side, 
companies, they prefer to issuing equity rather than getting long term loans for high 
price premium existing for the stocks which makes bank loans not so attractive. And 
also short term debt is preferred over long term debt for it is a general rule that short 
term loans play a similar role as long term debt, for companies can roll over the one-
year loan into the next year but with relative low costs compared with long-term loans.   
Different from what is found in Chen and Xue (2004), less difference exists between 
average market value of leverage ratios and book values, i.e. market values are around 
80% of the according book value ratios for main board companies. But for firms in 
SMEs board, it also holds as in Chen and Xue (2004) that market value ratios are only 
40% of the book ratios.  
In general, all leverage ratios are higher for companies from main board of SSE 
compared with firms from SMEs board of SZSE, which indicates that firms listed in 
SMEs board have more financial flexibility and less financial risk. And from the mean 
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value of different independent variables, some difference between main board in SSE 
and SMEs board in SZSE are identified. Firms from SMEs board are listed until quite 
recently (mean of AGE is less than 1) and from main board are listed already for some 
years( Mean of AGE is 6.29). Dominantly, firms in SMEs board are smaller in size, 
more profitable and have less volatile earnings. Another obvious difference is different 
ownership structure, for firms in main board, average of state-owned-share ratios is 0,36 
but by comparison, it is only 0,088 for SMEs board firms. 
From the correlation matrix in Table 18, low correlation coefficients between long term 
debt ratio and total debt ratio are found for the low proportion of long term debt.  
Among independent variables, based on difference between maximum (minimum) 
values and mean values we can detect possible spurious problems caused by extra 
different values from the sample. We found three observations with GO value of 45.48, 
40.12, -54.95 and one observation with VOL value of 26, which are far away from the 
mean of the rest and we run the regressions after dropping these observations.  
Table 13   Descriptive statistics of leverage ratios for main board firms. 
LTDRATIOBSL MSL BLL BTL MLL MTL LIA MLIA
 Mean  0.184037  0.294832  0.197642  0.068597  0.353285  0.052923  0.259935  0.493302  0.377664
 Median  0.106293  0.276563  0.174929  0.030170  0.334048  0.021746  0.228329  0.486690  0.359156
 Maximum  1.000000  2.179775  0.997351  0.563264  2.179775  0.501349  1.000000  1.744337  0.963068
 Minimum  0.000000 -2.575758  0.000000  0.000000 -2.575758  0.000000  0.000566  0.079567  0.020929
 Std. Dev.  0.224115  0.303836  0.155898  0.098844  0.307711  0.082638  0.185850  0.203827  0.185223
 
Table 14   Descriptive statistics of independent variables for main board firms. 
AGE SO PRO TAN SIZE VOL NDT GO
 Mean  6.290210  0.359669  0.033786  0.517585  7.346269  1.382738  0.029976  2.111681
 Median  6.000000  0.405100  0.045277  0.517021  7.258519  0.328020  0.027876  1.685219
 Maximum 13.00000  0.837500  0.304187  0.848919  11.54384  26.00000  0.104034  45.48294
 Minimum 1.000000  0.000000 -1.365696  0.052191  4.844187  0.000000  0.002873 -54.95357
 Std. Dev. 3.583056  0.253126  0.103935  0.153890  0.906302  3.201890  0.015241  5.038185
 
 
 63 
Table 15   Descriptive statistics of leverage ratios for SME board firms. 
LTDRATIOBSL MSL BLL BTL MLL MLT BLIA MLIA
 Mean  0.186992  0.183704  0.090719  0.038476  0.212005  0.019098  0.109817  0.361222  0.199824
 Median  0.075784  0.158126  0.073253  0.013659  0.177860  0.005841  0.090024  0.397388  0.184597
 Maximum  1.000000  0.659332  0.387157  0.232862  0.679745  0.166278  0.424477  0.594557  0.445341
 Minimum  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.001344  0.000000  0.000609  0.064151  0.030129
 Std. Dev.  0.268530  0.161605  0.090306  0.054980  0.175062  0.032172  0.106187  0.142445  0.108060
 
Table 16  Descriptive statistics of independent variables for SME board firms. 
AGE SO PRO TAN SIZE VOL NDT GO
 Mean
 0.777778  0.088450  0.085214  0.475651  6.291454  0.215133  0.031436  2.704276
 Median
 1.000000  0.000000  0.083532  0.492522  6.254290  0.160289  0.025086  2.140284
 Maximum  1.000000  0.561500  0.172032  0.780325  7.491367  1.125000  0.098361  10.32059
 Minimum
 0.000000  0.000000  0.029940  0.191509  5.275560  0.000000  0.010060  1.177342
 Std. Dev.  0.421637  0.173858  0.030928  0.162613  0.484913  0.219166  0.019246  1.613737
 
Table 17 Descriptive statistics of leverage ratios for all firms. 
BSL MSL BLL BTL MLL MLT BLIA MLIA
 Mean  0.276388  0.183458  0.061195  0.317641  0.045965  0.229423  0.464448  0.353945
 Median  0.260103  0.156599  0.025441  0.314233  0.015485  0.202360  0.456862  0.338043
 Maximum
 2.179775  0.997351  0.563264  2.179775  0.501349  0.997351  1.744337  0.963068
 Minimum -2.575758  0.000000  0.000000 -2.575758  0.000000  0.000000  0.041982  0.014430
 Std. Dev.  0.289459  0.154145  0.091908  0.296033  0.076148  0.182345  0.199670  0.186158
 
Table 18 Correlation matrix of different leverage ratios. 
BSL MSL BLL BTL MLL MLT BLIA MLIA
BSL  1.000000
MSL  0.577888  1.000000
BLL
 0.109494  0.047322  1.000000
BTL
 0.975081  0.544742  0.314393  1.000000
MLL  0.112017  0.157957  0.926517  0.294172  1.000000
MLT  0.532619  0.906308  0.436230  0.582780  0.560470  1.000000
BLIA
 0.415719  0.526681  0.313610  0.450043  0.283578  0.563098  1.000000
MLIA
 0.421738  0.787507  0.370722  0.465641  0.495983  0.872762  0.694828  1.000000
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Correlation matrix of independent variables is reported in Table 19.  It can be seen that 
most correlations between different independent variables used in this study are rather 
small except the correlation coefficients between tangibility and non-debt tax shield, 
0.57, which might incur the problem of multi-collinearity. However, even though high 
correlation between tangibility and non-debt tax shields is found, none of them could be 
eliminated from our study for they proxy for different effects from different 
perspectives and couldn’t substitute for each other.  
Table 19 Correlation matrix of independent variables for the whole sample dataset. 
AGE SO PRO TAN SIZE VOL NDT GO
AGE  1.000000
SO  0.065710  1.000000
PRO -0.174831  0.080708  1.000000
TAN -0.087547  0.040041  0.181068  1.000000
SIZE  0.251141  0.129125  0.241764  0.187587  1.000000
VOL  0.042156 -0.070708 -0.152269 -0.001283 -0.045161  1.000000
NDT  0.075292  0.042611  0.110764  0.595639  0.211968 -0.033147  1.000000
GO  0.034866 -0.101516  0.025206  0.044236 -0.143952  0.013276  0.074070  1.000000
 
6.1.2. Comparison with previous studies 
We don’t compare descriptive statistics for the variables in the model with western 
studies for the accounting standards are still quite different in China from other 
industries countries and hence the data calculated based on accounting reports are not so 
comparable.  
Compared with previous empirical studies on capital structures of Chinese companies as 
showed in Table 20, even though the dataset used in this paper is from manufacturing 
industry and the previous studies use firms from all industries, similar ratios are 
reported. The potential reason might be that manufacturing industry categorized in SSE 
and SZSE include quite different product lines, such as food, electrics, mechanics, 
textile and others. And manufacturing industry is not a too risky industry or a highly 
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regulated one, its leverage ratios should be close to the average of the mean value of 
leverage ratios for all industries.  
Table 20 Comparison o f average leverage ratios with previous studies. 
Paper BLL BTL MLL MTL BLLA
This paper 0.06 0.33 0.05 0.24 0.47
Chen and Xue(2004) 0.06 0.48 0.03 0.19
Huang(2005) 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.12 0.44
Chen(2004) 0.07 0.45
 
6.2. Regression results 
The results of OLS regression for all firms are listed in Table 21. In the following parts, 
we will discuss the empirical results we have derived and analyze the potential reasons. 
Table 21 Regression results of determinants on different leverage ratios. 
AGE SO PRO TAN SIZE VOL NDT GO C R-squ
BSL 0.020 -0.052 0.960 0.390 -0.004 0.020 -2.780 0.006 0.013 0.189
t-value (4,46)** (-0.90) (5,91)** (3,31)** (-0.22) (3,31)** (-2,41)** (1.03) (0.10)
BLL -0.002 0.015 -0.099 0.264 0.020 0.000 -0.161 0.006 -0.230 0.253
t-value （ -1.59 ） (0.84) (-1,92)* (-7,34)** (3,89)** (-0.10) (-0.46) (2,28)** (-5,73)**
BTL 0.020 -0.037 1.070 0.551 0.002 0.022 -3.130 -0.012 -0.027 0.231
t-value (4,28)** (-0.64) (6,34)** (4,70)** (0.10) (3,38)** (-2,73)** (-1.35) (-0.21)
BLIA 0.010 -0.035 -1.072 0.455 0.047 0.000 -3.161 0.014 -0.033 0.408
t-value (2,7)** (-1.02) (-10,73)** (6,56)** (4,35)** (-0.15) (-4,65)** (2,68)** (-0.43)
MSL 0.007 -0.055 -0.340 0.120 0.038 0.083 -1.150 -0.008 -0.123 0.240
t-value (3,00)** (-1,85)* (-4,03)** (2,06)* (4,07)** (2,38)** (-1,94)* (2,74)** (-1,89)*
MLL 0.000 0.008 -0.060 0.192 0.014 0.001 0.014 -0.002 -0.152 0.238
t-value (-0.19) (0.55) (-1.43) (6,40)** (3,09)** (0.72) (0.05) (-1.23) (-4,55)**
MTL 0.007 -0.049 -0.304 0.309 0.047 0.010 -1.356 -0.025 -0.200 0.331
t-value (2,99)** (-1.47) (-3,12)** (4,58)** (4,42)** (2,58)** (-2,05)** (-4,89)*** (-2,67)**
MLIA 0.007 -0.020 -0.560 0.280 0.080 0.008 -2.110 -0.010 -0.300 0.430
t-value (2,96)** (-1.02) (-6,36)** (4,49)** (8,05)** (2,19)* (-3,41)** (-3,48)** (-4,43)**
Note: *  significant at 0.05  level
**  significant at 0.01  level
 
When dependent variable, leverage ratio, is measured by total liability to market value 
of total assets, R-square is the highest, 0.43 and R-square is 0.40 which is still much 
higher when book value of equity substitutes market value compared with when other 
measures are used. This indicates that total liability to total assets is a more suitable 
leverage ratio for it takes trades payable into consideration, which is a very important 
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financing source for most Chinese firms. When firms make financing decisions and also 
when creditors evaluate financial risks of a firm, total liability to total assets is the most 
widely used ratio in practice in China.  
6.2.1. Determinants of capital structure 
• Tangibility 
As can be seen, coefficients of tangibility are highly statistically significant for all eight 
leverage ratios. The results show that tangibility has positive relationship with all 
different leverage ratios. The positive role of tangibility on long-term debt ratios and 
total debt ratios are consistent with most of the previous empirical studies and also with 
theoretical predictions of static trade-off models. But the positive relation between 
short-term debt ratios and tangibility is different from what have been found in some 
western studies, such as Bevan and Danbolt (2002), Han-Suck Song (2005). Opposite 
effects of tangibility on short-term debt and long-term debt  are explained by the 
maturity matching principle, that is long-term debt are used to finance fixed assets and 
short-term debt are used for current assets financing in Bevan and Danbolt (2002).  
However, the situation is different in China. Short-term debt is usually rolled over to the 
next year and in essence, a large portion of short-term debt is used as long-term debt to 
finance long-term projects and fixed assets, which is a specific phenomenon for Chinese 
firms.  
• Profitability  
Profitability is mainly found to be inversely related to capital structure, supporting 
pecking-order prediction in six out of the eight leverage ratios; firms prefer using 
surplus generated by profits to finance investments. This result is also in line with the 
previous empirical studies on Chinese firms. Besides the obvious reason clarified in 
pecking order theory, some specific reasons for the negative effect of profitability on 
leverages for Chinese firms can be identified. From the supply side, banks are willing to 
lend more money to more profitable firms for the risk they take is smaller. But when a 
firm can also access funds from equity market, it usually prefers to financing through 
equity issues. The most important reason is by issuing new shares, firms can acquire 
substantial capital gains in the secondary markets for the immatureness of Chinese stock 
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market. And accompanied by incomplete company laws and lack of enough protection 
for individual shareholders, equity issue is a better choice for listed firms compared with 
bank loans.  
And for two of the eight leverage ratios, positive relation is found to favor the trade-off 
models. For the tax benefits of debt, the more profitable it is, the more debt it takes.  
• Size  
The results reveal that size is a significant positive determinant of leverage which is 
consistent with the prediction of trade-off model but opposite to pecking order theory, 
but the effect is rather small. This indicates that for Chinese firms, larger firms do have 
minor advantage over smaller ones in getting more banking loans for they have smaller 
bankruptcy risk.  
• Non-debt tax shields 
As what has been found in previous studies and as predicted by trade-off models, non-
debt tax shields are found to be a negative determinant for all leverage ratios except 
long-term debt ratio. This result is also quite interesting for it indicates that increase in 
non-debt tax shields affect short-term and total debt leverage negatively which means 
that non-debt tax shields are substitutes for the tax benefits of short-term financing and 
therefore for total debt financing. But when consider long term borrowing, NDT is not  
a determinant to make the decision. This can be explained by the small percentage of 
long-term debt in total debt. When firms are engaged in tax shelter schemes, they 
mainly consider short-term debt for this is the main part and again, specially, a rather 
stable financing part for Chinese firms.  
• Years listed on the stock exchange 
The longer a firm listed on a stock exchange, the higher leverage ratios. Firms listed for 
a longer time have less asymmetric information compared with new listed firms. Hence, 
they face with lower cost of equity financing and they would like to take more equity 
financing which results in decrease of leverage ratios. This is the decreasing effect of 
years listed on stock markets on leverage ratios. On the other hand, longer listed firms 
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also have longer and closer relationship with banking systems. They can get more debt 
compared with newly listed firms, which would result in higher leverage ratios. The 
empirical results can be explained by the second effect of years listed on stock exchange 
plays a more important role in corporate borrowing.  
• Volatility 
Different from what is predicted by trade-off models and main results from western 
studies, positive relationship between earnings variability and most of leverage ratios is 
found. This special result can be attributed to the highly regulated credit market in 
China. Currently, interest rates are still decided by the central bank rather than by 
market force. Commercial banks only have the authority to decide whether to approve a 
loan or not but have no power in lending money with different interest rates to different 
companies. And listed companies are all the best ones in their industries and most are 
state-owned companies. As a result, relative riskier companies can get loans at the 
regulated interest rates which are lower than the interest rates when market plays the 
decisive role. Under this circumstance, riskier firms tend to take advantage of the 
regulated credit market and would like to take more “cheaper” debt.  
• Growth opportunity  
Results about relation between leverage ratios and growth opportunities are quite mixed, 
positive between book values of leverage and growth opportunities but negative 
between market values of leverage ratios and growth opportunities.  
According to the trade-off theory, firms with more growth opportunities also face with 
bigger bankruptcy risk and hence take less debt. Besides, they have more flexibility to 
invest sub-optimally for possessing more growth opportunities and the asset substitution 
problem incurred by risky debt is more serious. Therefore, the firms choose to issue 
more equity rather than debt. Another possible explanation is that firms with a lot of 
growth opportunities prefer to keep leverage low so that they don’t need to give up 
profitable investment in the near future for lack of funds.  The negative relation between 
market-to-book values and book leverage ratios support trade-off theory.  
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On the other hand, the positive relation derived between growth opportunities and 
market values of leverage can be explained by pecking order model. From the 
demanding side, firms with more growth opportunities are in cash flow deficit and in 
order not to give up growth opportunities, they have to turn to bank loans rather than 
equity financing. The reason why firms with more growth opportunities choose debt 
rather than equity financing is that they face more asymmetric information and hence 
higher cost of equity financing. From the supply side, not only the equity market but 
also the banks recognize the value of growth opportunities. Hence, the banks allocate 
bigger debt capacity for firms belong to this category.  
• State-owned share ratio 
State-owned share ratio is identified as a non-significant factor of leverage ratios for 
none of the coefficients in all regression is statistically significant.  
6.2.2. Comparison between big firms and SMEs 
It is often argued that significant difference should exist between big firms and SMEs in 
financing. By regress two samples individually with MLIA, a preliminary study is done 
in this part. According to the criteria used in China, firms with employees less than 
2000, or total assets less than 400 million RMB, or net sales less than 300 million RMB 
are all categorized into SMEs.  
From the results listed in Table 22, almost the exact same sets of determinants are found 
for both lines of firms except volatility which is positively related to SMEs but not to 
big firms.  
Table 22  Comparison between big firms and SMEs. 
AGE SO PRO TAN SIZE VOL NDT GO C RSQ
SMEs MLIA 0.008 -0.044 -0.482 0.367 0.065 0.008 -2.069 -0.007 -0.259 0.433
t-value (2,76)** ( -1.08) (-5,30)** (4,54)** (4,49)** (2,00)* (-2,66)** (-2,28)* (-2,70)**
Big firms MLIA 0.006 -0.027 -0.805 0.212 0.067 0.003 -2.955 -0.060 0.001 0.443
t-value (1,89)* (-0.59) (-3,03)** (2,18)* (4,30)** (-0.43) (-3,00)** (-5,51)** ( -0.99)
Note: *  significant at 0.05  level
**  significant at 0.01  level
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6.2.2. Comparison with previous empirical studies of Chinese firms 
Results of all available empirical studies on determinants of capital structure of Chinese 
firms and this study are listed in Table 23.  
Table 23 Results of empirical studies on determinants of leverage for Chinese firms. 
Characteristics Chen(2004) HS(2005) Chen&Xue(2004) T(2005)
Chen&Roger(
2005)
Results of
this paper
Volatility ns + ns(-) + +
Tangibility + + + +
Non-debt tax shields ns - -
Profitability - - - - - -
Growth opportunities + - ns(+) + ?
Size ? + ns(+) ns(+) + +
Dividend payout ns(-) ns(+)
Managerial shareholdings ns(-)
Institutional shareholdings ns -
Years listed on stock markets + +
State-owned shares ratio ns(-) ns(-)
 
 Note: 
 Ns(-)or ns(+) means  non-significant with negative sign or positive sign. 
? represents mixed results are given 
As seen from table, the results derived from this paper are quite in line with the majority 
predictions, i.e. volatility, tangibility, size and years listed on stock exchange are 
identified as positive determinants for most of the leverage ratios we adopted. And 
profitability and non-debt tax shields are inversely related to most of the leverage ratios. 
For growth opportunities, its effect on leverage is still unclear for both positive and 
negative effect are found in this paper and also in previous empirical studies. And from 
all the results, it is difficult to decide which one should be the dominant role of growth 
opportunities on leverage ratios.  
It is not surprising that the results are quite similar even though we adopt a different 
sample dataset in the study compared with the above-mentioned studies. Those studies 
use cross-sectional data while we only use firms in manufacturing industry. The same 
potential reasons could explain the similarity as in explaining the similar leverage ratios 
compare with previous studies. One is that firms in manufacturing industry are 
composed of different product categories, such as food, clothing, mechanic, metal and 
others. The other one is that in industry risk ranking list, manufacturing locates in the 
middle part. Hence, the characteristics of this industry are quite similar to the average 
level of all industries.  
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One interesting result is that in most previous studies, such as Chen and Xue (2005), 
market values are not suggested to measure leverage, but according to what we have 
found, by adopting market values of leverage ratios, similar results are derived as when 
book values of leverage ratios are adopted.  
6.3. Summary 
Based on 336 public listed firms from SSE and SZSE, identified significant positive 
determinants of capital structure include tangibility, size, volatility and years listed on 
the stock markets; negative factors are profitability and non-debt tax shields. State-
owned share ratio doesn’t play a significant role in capital structure. All results are quite 
similar to the dominant result from previous empirical studies on determinants of capital 
structure for Chinese firms. Besides, almost the same sets of significant independent 
variables are found for big firms and SMEs respectively.  
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7.   CONCLUSTIONS 
We examined the capital structure of public listed firms in manufacturing industry on 
Chinese stock market by using 336 firm data from 2004 to 2005. Eight independent 
variables are used in the study based on previous empirical studies on Chinese firms.  
The results are quite consistent with theoretical predictions, partly support pecking order 
theory and others support trading-off theory and similar set of determinants of capital 
structure are found compared with western countries. It indicates somehow that even 
though in the past bank lending activities in china are quite dependent on relationship 
between firms and banks, the situation has changed a lot. If the relationship still plays 
dominant role in bank lending, then different determinants or different effects of 
relevant factors are expected to be derived from the empirical studies. However, the 
empirical results prove quite similar results to western studies, such as tangibility is a 
very important positive factor in determining leverage ratios of firms. Also, state-owned 
share ratios play no roles in determining the leverage ratios. It means that banks are 
placing more emphasis on corporate borrowers’ financial and managerial conditions 
when they make lending decisions rather than predominantly dependent on the 
relationship factor. This result is consistent with Hideto and Ko (2006). 
However, for the special institutional environments in China, especially the small size 
of bond markets, immatureness of stock markets and the highly regulated banking 
systems, some difference between Chinese studies and western ones are found, namely 
much lower long-term debt to total debt and the positive effect of volatility on leverage 
ratios of Chinese firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73 
REFERENCE 
Aboody, D., and Lev, B.(2000). Information asymmetry, R&D and insider gains. 
Journal of Finance 55, 2747-2766.  
Baker Malcolm P., and Wurgler Jeffery (2002). Market timing and Capital Structure. 
Journal of Finance 57:1, 1-32.  
Bennett, M. and Donnelly, R. (1993). The determinants of capital structure: some UK 
evidence. British Accounting Review 1:25, 43-59.  
Berger, A. and Udell, G. (1995). Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm 
finance. Journal of Business 68, 351-381.  
Best, R., Hodges, C., and Lin, B. (2004). Does information asymmetry explain the 
diversification discount? Journal of Financial Research 27, 235-349. 
Bevan, A.A. and Danbolt, J. (2002). Capital structure and its determinants in the United 
Kingdom: a decomposition analysis. Applied Financial Economics 12:3, 159-
170.  
Bradley, Michael, Gregg Jarrell, and E. Han Kim (1984). On the Existence of an 
optimal capital structure: theory and evidence. Journal of Finance 39, 857-878. 
Brander, James A. and Tracy R. Lewis (1986). Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The 
limited Liability Effect. American Economic Review 76, 956-970.  
Chang, Chun (1999). Capital structure as optimal contracts. North American Journal of 
Economics and Finance 10:2, 363-385. 
Chaplinsky, Susan and Greg, Niehaus (1990). The determinants of inside ownership and 
leverage. Working paper, University of Michigan. 
Chen Jean J & Yan Xue (2005). New Empirical Panel Study on the Capital Structure of 
Chinese Listed Companies. Working paper, University of Surrey, Available at: 
<URL:http://www.fma.org/Zurich/Papers/130206.pdf> 
 74 
Chen Jean J (2004). Determinants of Capital Structure of Chinese-listed Companies. 
Journal of Business Research 57:12: 1341-1351. 
Chen Jian & Roger Strange (2005). The Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence 
from Chinese Listed Companies. Economic Change and Restructuring 38:1, 11-
35. 
DeAngelo, H., & R. Masulis, 1980. Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and 
Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial Economics 8, 3-29.  
DeMiguel, Alberto & Julio Pindado (2001). Determinants of capital structure: new 
evidence from Spanish panel data. Journal of corporate finance 7, 77-99.  
Devic Aleksandar, Bojan Krstic (2001). Comparatible Analysis of the Capital Structure 
Determinants in Polish and Hungarian Enterprises. Economics and organization 
1:9, 85-100. 
Fama, E., & K. French, 2002. Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about 
dividends and debt. Review of Financial Studies 15, 1-33.  
Frank, M. & Goyal, V. (2003). Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure. 
Journal of Financial Economics 67, 217-248.  
Frank, M.Z., & Goyal, V.K. (2004). The Effect of Market Conditions on Capital 
Structure Adjustment. Jounal of Financial Economics67, 217-248.  
Fraser Donald R., Hao Zhang, Chek Derashid (2006). Capital Structure and Political 
Patronage: The case of Malaysia. Journal of Banking & Finance 30, 1291-1308. 
Friend, Irwin & Joel Hasbrouck (1988). Determinants of Capital Structure, in Andy 
Chen ed. Research in Finance 7, pp. 1-19.  
Friend, Irwin & Larry, Lang (1988). An empirical test of the impact of managerial self-
interest on corporate capital structure. Journal of Finance 43, 271-281. 
 75 
Frydenberg, Stein (2003). Theory of Capital Structure - A Review. Frihet og Mangfold 
Frihet og mangfold. Festskrift til Odd G. Arntzen. L. Fallan & O. Gustafsson, 
Trondheim: Tapir/T. Available at: <URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=556631> 
Giammarino, R.M., & E.H. Neave (1982). The Failure of Financial Contracts and the 
Relevance of Financial Policy. Queens University Working Paper, No. 82-3. 
Guanqun Tong & Christopher J. Green (2005). Pecking Order or trade-off Hypothesis? 
Evidence on the Capital Structure of Chinese companies. Applied Economics 
37:19, 2179-2189. 
Gonedes, Nicholas J., Larry Lang, & Mathias Chikaonda (1988). Empirical results on 
managerial incentives and capital structure. Working paper. The Wharton 
School. University of Pennsylvania.  
Halov, N., & Heider, F. (2004). Capital Structure, Risk and Asymmetric Information. 
Working Paper, Stern School of Business, New York University.  
Han-Suck Song (2005). Capital Structure Determinants: an Empirical Study of Swedish 
Companies. Working Paper, the Royal Institute of Technology Stockholm. 
Available at: <URL http://www.infra.kth.se/cesis/documents/WP25.pdf> 
Harris,M. & A. Raviv (1988). Corporate Control Contest and Capital Structure. Journal 
of Financial Economics 20, 55-86. 
Harris,M. & A. Raviv (1990a). Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt. 
The Journal of Finance 45, 321-349. 
Harris,M. & A. Raviv (1991). The Theory of Capital Structure. Journal of Finance 46, 
297-356.  
Hideto Skashita,  & Ko Nakayama (2006). Panel Analysis of Chinese Corporate Debt-
How Far Have Market Mechanisms Penetrated? Bank of Japan Working Paper 
Series. Available at: <URL: http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/ronbun/ron/wps/data 
            /wp06e12.pdf> 
 76 
Hovakimian, A.(2003). Are Observed Capital Structures Determined by Equity Market 
Timing? AFA 2005 Phaladelphia Meetings. Available at SSRN:<URL 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=413387> 
Huang Samuel G.H. & Song Frank M. (2005). The Determinants of Capital Structure: 
Evidence from China. HIEBS (Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business 
Strategy) Working paper. Available at <URL:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=320088> 
Israel, R. (1991). Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: the Defensive 
Role of Debt Financing. Journal of Finance 46, 1391-1410.  
Jensen, Michael C. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323-339.  
Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, W.H.(1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Strcuture. Journal of Financial 
Economics 3, 305-360.  
Jian Chen & Roger Strange (2005). The Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence 
from Chinese Listed Companies. Economic Change and Restructuring 38:1, 11-
35. 
Kayhan, A. & Titnan,S. (2004). Firms’ histories and Their Capital Structure. NBER 
Working Paper 10526.  
Kester, Carl W. (1986). Capital and ownership structure: a comparison of United states 
and Japanese manufacturing corporations. Financial Management, 5-16. 
Kim, Wi Saeng & Eric H. Sorensen (1986). Evidence on the impact of the agency costs 
of debt in corporate debt policy, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
21, 131-144.  
Kim, E.H.(1978). A Mean Variance Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Corporate 
Debt Capacity. Journal of Finance 33, 45-64. 
 77 
Kraus, Alan & Litzenberger, Robert (1973). A State Preference Model of Optimal 
Financial Leverage. Journal of Finance 28, 911-922. 
Lemmon, M.L. & J. Zender (2002). Debt Capacity and Tests of Capital Structure 
Theories. Working Paper. University of Colorado and University of Utah.  
Long, Michael & Ileen Malitz (1985). The investment financing nexus: some empirical 
evidence. Midland Corporate Finance Journal 3, 53-59.  
MacKay Peter & Gordon M. Phillips (2005). How Does Industry Affect Firm Financial 
Structure?  Review of Financial Studies 18:4, 1433-1466. 
Makesimovic, V., & Titaman, S. (1991). Financial Policy and Reputation for Product 
Quality. Review of Financial Studies 4, 175-200.  
Makesimovic, V. (1988). Capital Structure in Repeated Obligopolies. RAND Journal of 
Economics 19:3, 389-407.  
Mamoru Nagano (2004). Determinants of Corporate Capital Structure in East Asia: Are 
there differences from the Industrialized Countries? Working paper series, 
Waseda University, WIF-04-002.  
Manohar Singh, Wallace N. Davidson III, Jo-Ann Suchard (2003). Corporate 
diversification strategies and capital structure. The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance 43, 147- 167. 
Marsh, Paul (1982). The choice between equity and debt: an empirical study. Journal of 
Finance 37, 121-144.   
Modigliani, F. & Merton H. Miller (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, Vol.48, No.3, 
pp. 261-297. 
Modigliani, F. & Merton H. Miller (1963). Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of 
Capital. American Economic Review 53, 433-443.  
 78 
Myers Stewart C. & Majluf Nicholas S.(1984).Corporate Financing and Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. NBER 
Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
Rajan Raghuram G., & Zingales Luigi (1995). What do we Know about Capital 
Structure? Some Evidence from International Data. Journal of Finance 50, 
1421-1460. 
Schowalter, D. (1995). Oligopoly and Financial Structure: Comment.  American 
Economic Reviews 85:3,647-653.  
Shyam-Sunder, L. & S. Myers (1999). Testing Static Tradeoff Against Pecking Order 
Model of Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 219-244.  
Stiglitz, Joseph E (1969). A Re-examination of the Modigliani-miller Theorem. The 
American Economic Review 59: 784-793. 
Stulz, R. (1988). Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the 
Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25-54.  
Stulz, Rene (1990). Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies. Journal of 
Financial Economics 26, 3-27.  
Subramaniam, V. (1998). Efficient Sourcing and Debt Financing in Imperfect Product 
Markets. Management Science 44:9, 1167-1178.  
Tijs de Bie & Leo de Haan (2004). Does Market Timing Drive Capital Structure? A 
Panel Data Study for Dutch Firms. DNB Working Paper, NO.16/2004. 
Titman, Sheridan (1984). The Effect of Capital Structure on a Firm’s Liquidation 
Decision. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 137-151.  
Titman, Sheridan & Roberto Wessels (1988). The determinants of capital structure 
choice. Journal of Finance 43, 1-19.  
 79 
Tong Guanqun & Green Christopher J. (2005). Pecking Order or trade-off Hypothesis? 
Evidence on the Capital Structure of Chinese companies. Applied Economics 
37:19, 2179-2189. 
Welch, I. (2004). Capital Structure and Stock Returns. Journal of Political Economy 
112:1, 106-131.  
Yapana Wiwattanakantang (1999). An empirical study on the determinants of the 
capital structure of Thai firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 7, 371-403. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
Appendix 
Lists of sample firms 
No. Name Code Time listed
1 INNER MONGOLIA JINYU GROUP CO.LTD 201 1999
2 SHANGHAI FUSUN PHAR. CO.LTD 196 1998
3  JIANGZHONG PHAR. CO.LTD 750 1996
4 SHANGHAI PHAR.CO.LTD 849 1994
5 TIANJIN TASLY PHAR. CO.LTD 535 2002
6 BEIJING TONGRENTANG CO.LTD 85 1998
7 HAEBIN PHAR. GROUP CO.LTD 664 1993
8 NORTH CHINA PHAR. CO.LTD 812 1994
9 SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL UNITED HOLDINGS CO.LTD 607 1992
10 ZHEJIANG MEDICINE CO.LTD 216 1999
11 KUNMING PHAR. CO.LTD 422 2000
12 JIAODA ONLLY CO.LTD 530 2001
13 JOINCARE PHARMACEUTICAL GROUP INDUSTRY CO.LTD 380 2001
14 STAR LAKE BIOSCIENCE CO.INC 866 1994
15 GUANGXI BEISHENG PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 556 2001
16 GUANGDONG KANGMEI PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LT 518 2001
17 WUHAN SPRING BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING STOCKS CO.LTD 421 2004
18 WUHAN MAYINGLONG PHARMACEUTICAL GROUP CO.LTD 993 2004
19 ZHEJIANG CONBA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 572 2004
20 GUANGZHOU PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 332 2001
21 ZHUZHOU QIANJIN PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 479 2004
22 ZHEJIANG HUAHAI PHARMACEUTCAL CO.LTD 521 2003
23 ZHANGZHOU PIENTZEHUANG PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 436 2003
24 JIANGSU LIANHUAN PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 513 2003
25 DALIAN MERRO PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 297 2000
26 JIANGSU KANION PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 557 2002
27 JIANGSU HENGRUI MEDICINE CO.LTD 276 2000
28 NANJING MEDICAL CO.LTD 713 1996
29 TONGHUA DONGBAO PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 867 1994
30 HUBEI QIANJIANG PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 568 2001
31 BEIHAI GOFAR MARINE BIOLOGICAL INDUSTRY CO.LTD 538 2003
32 HENAN LINGRUI PHARMACEUTIAL CO.LTD 285 2000
33 INNER MONGOLIA EERDUOSI CASHMERE PRODUCTS CO.LTD 295 1995
34 QINGHAI XIANCHENG INDUSTRY STOCK CO.LTD 381 2001
35 HUAFANG LIMITED COMPANY 448 2001
36 SHANGHAI SHENDA CO.LTD 626 1993
37 SHANGHAI SANMAO ENTERPRISE CO.LTD 689 1993
38 SHANGHAI WORLDBEST INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO.LTD 757 1996
39 SHANGHAI HAIXIN GROUP 851 1994
40 SHANGHAI KAIKAI INDUSTRY CO.LTD 272 1997
41 SHANGHAI DRAGON CORPORATION 630 1993
42 SHANGHAI MET CORPORATION 645 1994
43 NINGBO VEKEN ELITE GROUP CO.LT 152 1998
44 YOUNGOR GROUP CO.LTD 177 1998
45 FUJIAN NANFANG TEXTILE CO.LTD 483 2004
46 ZHEJIANG FURUN CO.LTD 70 1997
47 AEROSPACE COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS CO.LTD 677 1993
48 HUBEI TIANHUA CO.LTD 745 1996
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49 HUBEI MAILYARD SHARE CO.LTD 107 1997
50 HUNAN HUASHENG CO.LTD 156 1998
51 FUJIAN FENGZHU TEXTILE SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 493 2004
52 BLACK PEONY CO.LTD 510 2002
53 JIANGSU HONGDOU INDUSTRY CO.LD 400 2001
54 JIANGSU SUNSHINE CO.LTD 220 1999
55 CANAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHONOLOGICAL CO.LTD 398 2000
56 WUXI QINGFENG CO.LTD 576 2003
57 DALIAN DAYANG TRANDS CO.LTD 233 2000
58 LIAONING TIMES GARMENTS I/E INC. 241 2000
59 JIANGSU SANFANGXIANG INDUSTRY CO.LTD 370 2003
60 HENAN REBECCA HAIR PRODUCETS CO.LTD 439 2003
61 WANXIN CO.LTD 63 1997
62 BAOTOU TOMORROW TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 91 1997
63 MOGOLIA YILI TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 277 2000
64 INNER MONGOLIA LANTAI INDUSTRIAL CO.LTD 328 2000
65 DAYUAN CO.LTD 146 1999
66 SHANDONG HUAYANG TECHNOLOGY CO.LT 532
67 WEIFANG YAXING CHEMICAL CO.LTD 319 2001
68 SHANDONG LUBEI CHEMICAL CO.LTD 727 1996
69 QINGDAO JIANYE CO.LTD 229 2000
70 SHANDONG DACHENG PESTICIDE CO.LTD 882 1995
71 QINGDAO YELLOW SEA RUBBER CO.LTD 579 2002
72 YANTAI WNAHUA POLYURETHANES CO.LTD 309 2001
73 TAIYUAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY CO.LTD 281 2000
74 SHANXI ANTAI GROUP CO.LTD 408 2003
75 SHANXI COKING CO.LTD 740 1996
76 CHINA FIBERGLASS CO.LTD 176 1999
77 SHANGHAI SANJIU TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CO.LTD 614 1992
78 SHANGHAI WORLDBEST CO.LTD 94 1996
79 SHANGHAI LIANHUA FIBRE CORPORATION 617 1992
80 SINOTEX INVESTMENT&DEVELOPMENT CO.LTD 61 1997
81 BLUE STAR NEW CHEMICAL MATERIALS CO.LTD 299 2000
82 SHANGHAI 3F NEW MATERIAL CO.LTD 636 1993
83 SHANGHAI JIAHUA UNITED CO.LTD 315 2001
84 SINOPEC SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL CO.LTD 688 1993
85 SHANGHAI FENGHWA GROUP CO.LTD 615 1992
86 SHANGHAI WHITECAT SHAREHOLDING CO.LTD 633 1993
87 SICHUAN TIANYI SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 378 2001
88 SICHUAN HONGDA CO.LTD 331 2001
89 USTC CHUANGXIN CO.LTD 551 2002
90 XIAMEN FARATRONIC CO.LTD 563 2002
91 XIAMEN ELECTRICS 870 1995
92 AMOI ELECTRONICS CO.LTD 57 1997
93 YANTAI XINCHAO INDUSTRY CO.LTD 777 1996
94 HISENSE ELECTRIC CO.LTD 60 1997
95 SVA INFORMATION INDUSTRY CO.LTD 637 1993
96 SHANGHAI BELLING CORP.LTD 171 1998
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97 SVA ELECTRON CO.LTD 602 1992
98 CHENGDU XUGUANG ELECTRONICS CO.LTD 353 2002
99 SICHUAN CHANGHONG ELECTRIC CO.LTD 839 1994
100 BGRIMM MAGNETIC MATERIALS&TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 980 2004
101 BEIJING DYNAMIC POWER CO.LTD 405 2004
102 TDG HOLDING CO.LTD 330 2001
103 ROUTON ELECTRONIC CO.LTD 355 2002
104 JILIN SINO-MICROELECTRONICS CO.LTD 360 2001
105 JIANGXI LIANCHUANG OPTOELECTRONIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 363 2001
106 DAXIAN CO.LTD 747 1996
107 HANGZHOU SILAN MICROELECTRONICS CO.LTD 460 2003
108 JIANGSU CHANGJIANG ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 584 2003
109 ZHEJIANG KING REFRIGERATION INDUSTRY CO.LTD 340 2003
110 CHANGSHA LYRUN MATERIAL CO.LTD 478 2003
111 CSG HOLDING CO.LTD 12
112 BAOSHAN IRON&STEEL CO.LTD 19 2000
113 SHANDONG ALUMINIUM INDUSTRY CO.LTD 205 1999
114 BAOJI TITANIUM INDUSTRY CO.LTD 456 2002
115 SHANDONG NANSHAN INDUSTRIAL CO.LTD 219 1999
116 XINHUA METAL PRODUCTS CO.LTD 782 1996
117 SHANGHAI YAOHUA PIKINGTON GLASS CO.LTD 819 1994
118 GUODONG CO.LTD 321 2001
119 CHENGDU DR.PENG TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 804 1994
120 JIANGSU GAOCHUN CERAMICS .LTD 562 2003
121 SICHUAN ATLANTIC WELDING CONSUMABLE CO.LTD 558 2001
122 XINJIANG BAYI IRON&STEEL CO.LTD 581 2002
123 XINJIANG JOINWORLD CO.LTD 888 1996
124 ZHEJIANG JIANFENG GROUP CO.LTD 668 1993
125 GANSU QILIANSHAN CEMENT GROUP CO.LTD 720 1993
126 GUANGZHOU RONGTAI CO.LTD 589 2000
127 GUANGZHOU IRON AND STEEL CO.LTD 894 1996
128 HUAXIN CEMENT CO.LTD 801 1994
129 WUHAN IRON AND STEEL CO.LTD 5 1999
130 MARKOR INTERNATIONAL FURNITURE CO.LTD 337 2000
131 GUANGDONG YIHUA TIMBER INDUSTRY CO.LTD 978 2004
132 JIANGSU SHUANGLIANG CO.LTD 481 2003
133 CHANGCHUN YIDONG CLUTCH CO.LTD 148 1998
134 SHANGHAI JIELONG INDUSTRY CORPORATION LIMITED 836 1993
135 ANHUI SHANYING PAPER INDUSTRY CO.LTD 567 2001
136 NANZHI CO.LTD 163 1998
137 FUJIAN QINGSHAN PAPER INDUSTRY CO.LTD 103 1997
138 SHANDONG HUATAI PAPER CO.LTD 308 2000
139 QINGDAO HAIER CO.LTD 690 1993
140 WOLONG ELECTRIC GROUP 580 2002
141 ZHEJIANG FEIDA ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 526 2002
142 ANHUI QUANCHAIDONGLI 218 1998
143  ANHUI HELI 761 1996
144 TONGLING SANJIA 520 2002
145 CHINA TEXTILE MACHINERY CO.LTD 610 1992
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146 ANHUI TONGFENG ELECTRONICS CO.LTD 237 2000
147 INNER MONGOLIA NORTH HAULER JOINT STOCK CO.LTD 262 2000
148 QINGHAI HUADING INDUSTRIAL CO.LTD 243 2000
149 FUJIAN LONGXI 592 2002
150 XIAMEN ENGINEERING MACHINERY CO.LTD 815 1994
151 FUJIAN LONGKING CO.LTD 388 2000
152 CITYCHAMP DARTONG CO.LTD 67 1997
153 SHANDONG HEUNGKONG HOLDING CO.LTD 162 1998
154 JINNAN QINGQI 698 1993
155 QINGDAO AOAUCMA CO.LTD 336 2000
156 DONGAN HEIBAO CO.LTD 760 1996
157 SHANDONG XINHUA 587
158 TAIYUAN HEAVY INDUSTRY CO.LTD 169 1998
159 SHANXI BAOGUANG 379 2002
160 XIAN BIAOZHUN GONGYE 302 2000
161 HUDONG HEAVY MACHINERY CO.LTD 150 1998
162 SHANGHAI LIGHT INDUSTRY MACHINEARY CO.LTD 605 1992
163 SGSB GROUP CO.LTD 843 1994
164 SHANGHAI HAIGHLY CO.LTD 619 1992
165 SHANGHAI AEROSPACE AUTOMOBIL ELECTROMECHANICAL 151 1998
166 SHANGHAI AUTOMOTIVE CO.LTD 104 1997
167 DONGFENG ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 81 1997
168 SHNGHAI FOREVER CO.LTD 818 1994
169 SHANGHAI JIAOYUN CO.LTD 676 1993
170 PHOENIX CO.LTD 679 1993
171 SHANGHAI POWER TRANMISSION&DISTRIBUTION CO.LTD 627 1993
172 SHANGHAI ERFANGJI CO.LTD 604 1992
173 JIANGNAN HEAVY INDUSTRY CO.LTD 72 1997
174 SHANGHAI ZHENHUA PORT MACHINERY CO.LTD 320 1997
175 SICHUAN CHENGFA AERO-SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 391 2001
176 DONGFANG ELECTRICAL MACHINERY CO.LTD 875 1995
177 DONGFANG BOILERGROUP CO.LTD 786 1996
178 TIANJIN BENEFO TEJING ELECTRIC CO.LTD 468 2001
179 BEIQI FOTO MOTOR CO.LTD 166 1998
180 BEIJING AEROSPACE CHANGFENG CO.LTD 855 1994
181 TIANDI SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 582 2002
182 BEIJING WANDONG MEDICAL EQUIPMENT CO.LTD 55 1997
183 WUZHOU MINOVO CO.LTD 873 1995
184 TEBE CO.LTD 89 1997
185 JIAODA KUNJI HIGH-TECH CO.LTD 806 1994
186 ZHEJIANG HOLLEY TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 97 1997
187 NINGBO YUNSHENG 366 2000
188 LANZHOU CHANGCHENG 192 1998
189 CHINA JIALING INDUSTRIAL CO.LTD 877 1995
190 KEDA INDUSTRIAL CO.LTD 499 2002
191 GUANGZHOU SHIPYARD INTERNATIONAL CO.LTD 685 1993
192 GUANGDONG SHENGYI SCI.TECH CO.LTD 183 1998
193 GUANGDONG MINGZHU GROUP CO.LTD 382 2001
194 GUIZHOU GUIHANG AUTOMOTIVE CO.LTD 523 2001
195 HARBIN DONGAN AUTO ENGINE CO.LTD 178 1998
196 HARBIN AVIATION INDUSTRY CO.LTD 38 2000
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197 C&T TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CO.LTD 149 1999
198 ZHENGZHOU YUTONG BUS CO.LTD 66 1997
199 HENAN BINGXIONG 753 1996
200 CHANGZHENG HUOJIAN 879 1995
201 HUBEI HONGCHENG 566 2001
202 XIANGTAN DIANJI 416 2002
203 CHANGCHUN FAW-SIHUAN AUTOMOBILE CO.LTD 742 1996
204 GUODIAN NANJING AUTOMATION CO.LTD 268 1999
205 AEROSUN CORPORATION 501 2001
206 SUFOMA CO.LTD 290 2000
207 JIANGXI CHANGHE AUTOMOBILE CO.LTD 372 2001
208 PHENIX OPTICAL CO.LTD 71 1997
209 ANYUAN INDUSTRIAL CO.LTD 397 2002
210 SHENYANG JINBEI AUTOMOTIVE COMPANY LIMITED 609 1992
211 LIAONING SG AUTOMOTIVE GROUP CO.LTD 303 2000
212 DALIAN BINGSHAN RUBBER&PLASTICS CO.LTD 346 2001
213 ANHUI XINGMA 375 2003
214 SHANGHAI HANGTIAN 343 2003
215 BEIJING BEIFANG TIANNIAO 435 2003
216 WUXI HUAGUANG 475 2003
217 SHANGHAI ZHIXIN 517 2003
218 SHANDONG BINZHOU 960 2004
219 GUANZHOU DONGFANG 988 2004
220 BAOTOU BEIFANG 967 2004
221 JINXI CHEZHOU 495 2004
222 FENGFAN 482 2004
223 BEIJING JIZINTIANZHENG 560 2002
224 SHANGHAI JIDIAN 835 1994
225 TONGLING JINGDA 577 2002
226 JIANGSU SHUANGLIANG CO.LTD 481 2003
227 SHANGHAI CHAIYOUJI 841 1994
228 JIANGXI CHANGLI 507 2003
229 SHANXI JIANSHE 984 2004
230 NONGBO FUDA 724 1996
231 JIANGXI HONGDU 316 2000
232 CHANGCHU YIDONG 148 1998
233 ANHUI JIANGHUAI 418 2001
234 FENGSHEN TYRE 469 2003
235 CHONGQING WANLI 847 1994
236 S&P PHARMACEUTICAL CO.LTD 869 1995
237 TOPSUN 771 1996
238 SHANGDONG LUHANG 789 1997
239 SHANGDONG JINTAI  ST 385 2001
240 SHANXI YABAO 351 2002
241 JINHUA CO.LTD 80 1997
242 SHANGHAI MIDDLEWEST CO. 842 1994
243 SICHUAN DIKANG 466 2001
244 TIANJIN ZHONGXIN CO.LTD 329 2001
245 BEIJING TIANTAN CO.LTD 161 1998
246 BEIJING SHUANGHE 62 1997
247 TIBET NUODIKANG 211 1999
248 HANGZHOU TIANMUSHAN 671 1993
249 ZHEJANG QIANJIANG 796 1997
250 ZHEJIANG HAIZHENG 267 2000
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251 CHONGQING TAIJI 129 1997
252 HENAN TIANFANG 253 2000
253 HENAN TAILONG 222 1999
254 GUIZHOU YIBAI 594 2004
255 SHANGHAI MODERN 420 2004
256 WUHAN JIANMIN 976 2004
257 HUAFANG TEXTILE 273 2003
258 ZHENGJIANG HANGMIN 987 2004
259 SHANGHAI FUREN 781 1996
260 HAINAN XINGYE 259 2000
261 ZHONGYAN TEXTILE 763 1996
262 SHANGHAI ZHUZHI 555 1999
263 NINGBO SHANSHAN CO.LTD 884 1996
264 HUBEI XINGFA 141 1999
265 HUBEI KAILE NEW MATERIAL 260 2000
266 HUNAN HAILI 731 1996
267 HUNAN LIUYANG HUAPAO 599 2001
268 ZHOUZHOU TIME NEW MATERIAL 458 2002
269 LIAOYUAN DEHENG 699 1993
270 NANTONG 389 2001
271 JIANGSU YANNONG 486 2002
272 JIANGSU CHENGXING 78 1997
273 JIANGSU ZHONGDA 74 1997
274 SINOPEC FIBER 871 1995
275 WUXI TAIJI 667 1993
276 JIANGXI CHANGJIU 228 1999
277 DAHUA GROUP 951 1997
278 TANGSHAN SANYOU 409 2003
279 SHANGHAI ZHONGKE 490 2003
280 ZHEJIANG LONGSHENG 352 2003
281 LINGYUN GONGYE 480 2003
282 NANJING FIBER 889 1996
283 JIANGSU JIANGNAN 527 2003
284 ANHUI LIUGUO 470 2004
285 ANHUI LEIMING 985 2004
286 JIANGSU SHENLONG 401 2003
287 GUANGZHOUJINFA 143 2004
288 ANHUI GUOTONG 444 2004
289 SHANGDONG HUALU 426 2002
290 WUHAN LINUO 885 1996
291 TIANYI 703 1996
292 NANNING HUAGONG 301 2000
293 YUNDA TECH. 181 1998
294 YUNNAN YUNWEI 725 1996
295 LIUZHOU HUAGONG 423 2003
296 JIANGSU SUOPU 746 1996
297 SHANGHAI TYRE 623 1992
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298 ZHEJIANG NHU COMPANY LTD. 22001 2004
299 ZHEJIANG WEIXING INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO.LTD 3 2004
300 CHONGQING HUABANG PHARM.CO.LTD 4 2004
301 ELEC-TECH INTERNATIONAL CO.LTD 5 2004
302 HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING INC. 7 2004
303 JIANGSU MIRACLE LOGISTICS SYSTEM ENGINEERING CO.LTD 9 2004
304 ZHEJIANG TRANSFAR CO.LTD 10 2004
305 ZHEJIANG DUNAN ARTIFICIAL ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPMENT CO. LTD 11 2004
306 ZHEJIANG KAN SPECIALITIES MATERIAL CO.LTD 12 2004
307 HUBEI AVIATION PRECISION MACHINERY TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 13 2004
308 HUANGSHAN NOVEL CO.LTD 14 2004
309 XIAKE COLOR SPINNING CO.LTD 15 2004
310 GUANGDONG WELL MEDICINE S&T CO.LTD 16 2004
311 EASTCOMPEACE SMART CARD CO.LTD 17 2004
312 ANHUI HUAXING CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 18 2004
313 ZHENGJIANG HANGZHOU XINFU PHAR. CO.LTD 19 2004
314 ZHENGJIANG JINGXIN PHAR. CO.LTD 20 2004
315 ZOJE SEWINGMACHINE CO.LTD 21 2004
316 SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO-ENGINEERING CO.LTD 22 2004
317 GUIZHOU SPACE APPLIANCE CO.LTD 25 2004
318 SHANDONG WEIDA MACHINERY CO.LTD 26 2004
319 SHANGHAI SIYUAN ELECTRIC CO.LTD 28 2004
320 FUJIAN SEPTWOLVES INDUSTRY CO.LTD 29 2004
321 DAAN  GENE CO.LTD 30 2004
322 GUANGDONG GRETOO MOLDS INC. 31 2004
323 ZHEJIANG SUPOR COOKWARE CO.LTD 32 2004
324 ZHEJIANG MIZUDA PRINTING&DYEING GROUP CO.LTD 34 2004
325 ZHONGSHAN VANTAGE GAS APPLIANCE STOCK CO.LTD 35 2004
326 NINGBO YAK TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIAL CO.LTD 36 2004
327 GUIZHOU JIULIAN INDUSTRIAL EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT CO.LTD 37 2004
328 BEIJING SL PHARMECEUTICAL CO.LTD 38 2004
329 ANHUIFEIYA TEXTILE CO.LTD 42 2005
330 DEHUA TB NEW DECORATION MATERIAL CO.LTD 43 2005
331 JIANGSU SANYOU GROUP CO.LTD 44 2005
332 GUOGUANG ELECTRIC CO.LTD 45 2005
333 LUOYANG BEARING SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 46 2005
334 NONGBO HUAXIANG ELECTRONIC CO.LTD 48 2005
335 TANGSHAN JINGYUAN YUFENG ELECTRONICS CO.LTD 49 2005
336 ZHEJIANG SANHUA CO.LTD 50 2005
 
